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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this Master of Business Administration 
(MBA) project is to perform an industry analysis of the MBA 
market utilizing the principles of industry analysis noted 
in Michael Porter’s “Five Forces Analysis” model.  The 
intent of this project is to create an awareness of how 
these competitive forces: shape the MBA market, define the 
relationships between stakeholders within the market, and 
affect the overall attractiveness of the MBA market.  The 
goal is to provide GSBPP policy makers a tool to assist in 
the understanding of the industry environment and the 
development of a sustainable competitive position for the 
GSBPP.  The authors believe the GSBPP can benefit greatly 
from this knowledge.  The starting point of this project 
was to perform a comprehensive search and analysis of 
secondary resources for data concerning the nature of 
competition, incentives of buyers (students and 
employers/recruiters) and sellers (faculty), and threat of 
substitutes within the MBA market. It is noted that the 
nature of competition is a critical force affecting the MBA 
market, as an MBA program’s reputation drives almost all 
aspects of its strategy.  Full understanding of these 
market forces should help enable the GSBPP to aptly compete 
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Traditional business schools face threats to their 
competitive positioning as the educational industry becomes 
more diverse.  The ability of educational institutions to 
remain competitive is contingent upon their ability to 
correctly identify the factors that influence the industry 
and to adjust their strategy accordingly.  Specifically, 
The Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) Graduate School of 
Business and Public Policy (GSBPP) must develop a strategy 
to provide its customers and suppliers with greater value 
than the alternatives provided in a growing management 
business education industry.  
For its customers, providing greater value refers to 
GSBPP’s ability to provide the greatest “bang for the buck” 
in terms of benefits relative to costs.  With so many 
competitors in the market, there is no guarantee that GSBPP 
will perpetually continue to provide best value.  If at any 
point the school no longer provides the best value, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) will find other sources of 
supply for its graduate education requirements.   
The concept of best value is relative.  Understanding 
how GSBPP relates to its environment is critical to 
identifying the activities in which the school should 
engage.  However, this first necessitates a clear 
definition of the environment.  This thesis will rely 
primarily upon articles written by Michael Porter.  In his 
article “How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy,” Porter 
defines an industry as a group of firms that market 
products which are close substitutes for each other.   
2 
In the article, Porter identifies the five primary 
competitive forces.  These forces are the elements that 
this thesis will analyze with relation to the graduate 
business education industry as a whole and then as to how 
GSBPP’s position within the industry allows it to compete.  
The purpose of this MBA Graduate Project, in 
particular, is to conduct an industry analysis of the 
notional market for Master of Business Administration 
(MBAs) degrees.  In this endeavor, an identification and 
analysis of the market forces affecting the MBA market was 
conducted to determine what type of competitive positioning 
is necessary to be successful. By assessing these market 
forces, or any market forces for a given industry, business 
strategists provide insight that allows them to understand 
the competitive positioning of their organization within 
that industry.  This knowledge enables them to make 
informed decisions about the strategic direction of their 
company.   
Too often, strategic decisions are made in absence of 
this information.  This leads to a “marketing myopia” of 
sorts that usually appears in a company’s focus only on its 
buyers when making decisions regarding price, product, 
promotion, etc.  This can cause an organization to make 
strategic blunders because they fail to recognize how their 
decisions affect relationships with suppliers.  It can also 
cause them to give up valuable market share to its primary 
competitors.  Another problem that this ignorance can cause 
is inadvertently increasing demand for substitutes to its 
products.  Either of these situations can cause loss of 
money through diminished sales or increased input costs. 
3 
These principles not only apply to the private sector, 
but also to the public and non-profit sectors.  The same 
valuable lessons about understanding the industry in which 
an organization competes and of an organization’s 
positioning within that market are universal.  Even though 
you might not earn a profit, there are lessons to be 
learned about the environment in which you operate. 
In this case, the five forces approach will be 
employed to analyze attributes of the market for graduate 
business education, which will ultimately be used to 
evaluate the competitive position of the Naval Postgraduate 
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II. INDUSTRY ANALYSIS OVERVIEW  
A. INTRODUCTION TO INDUSTRY ANALYSIS AND THE FIVE FORCES 
Michael Porter’s articles, “How Competitive Forces 
Shape Strategy” and “Note on the Structural Analysis of 
Industries,” provide guidance on how to evaluate the 
competition in any industry.  Porter maintains, “The 
intensity of competition in an industry is neither a matter 
of coincidence or bad luck.”  He argues that the nature of 
competition is based on the economics of the industry and 
five basic competitive forces, which are illustrated in 





Both articles provide reference for the necessary 
background, which will be the basis for analyzing the 
business school industry.  Prior to delving into the 
specifics of the B-School industry, it is useful to provide 
6 
some background information and definitions on Porter’s 
five forces to better understand the common terms and 
ideas. 
The two Porter articles highlight the importance of 
examining the five forces for understanding what causes an 
industry to behave in a certain way.  The contention is 
that evaluation of these forces will provide insights into 
the prospects for long-range profitability.  Each of the 
forces is discussed below to offer a commonly accepted 
definition and enough background to allow the layman to 
understand the concepts in not only a general context but 
in the specific application to B-Schools.  
B. COMPETITION 
The first of the five forces influencing industry 
economics is the rivalry among existing competitors in a 
market.  Porter refers to this as “jockeying for position.”  
The intensity of the rivalry among competitors is related 
to the following factors: 
• Number and relative size of competitors 
• Level of industry growth 
• Degree of differentiation 
• Relative magnitude of fixed costs  
• Level of exit barriers 






Supplier power is a second force to be considered.  
Suppliers who have advantages of limited availability of 
their product may raise prices or reduce quality in an 
effort to increase their profits.  Actions such as these 
diminish the profit potential of competitors in a given 
industry if there is no alternative.  Porter suggests that 
a supplier group is powerful if: 
• It is dominated by few companies and is more 
concentrated than the industry to which it 
sells. 
• The input supplied is unique, differentiated or 
requires significant switching costs. 
• Suppliers pose a credible threat of forward 
integration. 
• Industry is not an important customer of the 
supplier group. 
D. BUYERS 
The buyer group constitutes the third industry force 
and this group is powerful if: 
• It is concentrated or purchases in large 
volume. 
• Products are standard or undifferentiated. 
• Products it purchases from the industry in 
question form a component and represent a 
significant fraction of cost. 
8 
• The buyer group earns low profits (increasing 
the incentive to lower its purchasing cost) 
• Product is unimportant to the quality of 
buyers’ products or services. 
E. SUBSTITUTES 
Substitutes are the fourth force.  They are products 
that can be used as alternatives and provide similar 
utility at less price.  The key to substitutes is the 
customer’s willingness or ability to trade off 
differentiated functionality for cost.  If an industry 
fails to differentiate in a way that prohibits the trade-
off, the substitute will place downward pressure on 
industry prices. 
F. THREAT OF ENTRY 
Threat of entry is the final force addressed.  The 
importance of this force is based on the premise that new 
competitors in an industry bring added capacity.  The added 
capacity will provide a downward pressure on prices as 
competitors fight for increased market share.  Entry 
barriers, however, can be high.  These high barriers 
increase the risk for the new entrant and can deter entry 
if the promise of profit is not great enough to outweigh 
the risk.  Porter cites six major barriers to entry: 
• Economies of Scale – force entrants to enter on a 
large scale or accept a cost disadvantage 
• Product Differentiation — implies finding a 
position to overcome entrenched customer 
loyalties 
9 
• Capital Requirements - need for large sums of 
upfront capital which may not be recoverable  
• Cost Disadvantages independent of size – 
advantages attained through learning curve, 
proprietary technology, geographic location, etc. 
• Access to distribution channels – new entrants 
must find room or displace current competitors to 
get their product to market 
• Government policy – industry regulations, 
controls, accreditation and licensing 
requirements may prohibit entry to potential 
competitors. 
G. OTHER INDUSTRY FORCES 
While Porter’s approach identifies and analyzes the 
five key forces in any market, there may also be other 
forces that may not fit neatly into one of these five 
categories but may nonetheless significantly affect any 
given market’s economics and structure.  It is up to the 
individual organization to investigate their respective 
markets thoroughly to determine what other forces are out 
there.  Forces could range from external stakeholders, such 
as the media and government, to organizations that produce 
complements that impact the demand for the primary products 
in that market.  In any case, for each force or stakeholder 
group, it is important to understand its degree of leverage 
over the organization as well as its incentives as they 
relate to its interaction with the organization. 
The need to look beyond the basic five forces is 
observable in the personal computer market, where 
10 
complementors play a key role.  Manufacturers of peripheral 
devices, such as printers, monitors, and software, do not 
compete with personal computers.  They do, however, 
interact with the computer manufacturers by either 
collaborating with them or with their competition.  By 
making devices for use on or with the personal computers, 
they enhance the desirability of the computers themselves, 
and in this way their products serve as complements to the 
personal computer industry.  It is important for the 
computer manufacturers to consider this when determining 
their competitive strategies within the computer market.  
If they overlook the manufactures of the peripherals, they 
could alienate themselves and drive them to form strategic 
partnerships with other firms in the market.  And, if they 
want to elicit the help of the peripheral manufacturers, 
they need to consider what types of incentives they are 
prepared to offer them to earn their loyalty.  This shows 
that there are more forces at play than just the 
competitors, buyers, suppliers, substitutes, and potential 
entrants.  It is important that a thorough investigation 
and analysis of the market and all key stakeholders be 
conducted so that no stakeholder is left out. 
H. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology in applying the five forces analysis 
to the MBA market was to scrutinize each of the “five 
forces” to see exactly how each would be utilized to 
understand the effects they collectively have on the 
economics and structure in the market for MBA education.  
We conducted an in-depth search of secondary research to 
gather information to answer questions pertaining to each 
of the five forces.  Upon completion of our research, we 
11 
concluded that the major forces that affect the MBA market 
were competition between business schools, buyers of 
business education including both students and employers, 
faculty as the key suppliers to the industry, and 
substitutes in the forms of alternative means of delivering 
graduate business education.  Because the factors 
contributing to barriers to entry in the industry primarily 
consist of factors, (such a building a reputation) which 
were also relevant to the nature of competition, potential 
entrants were not considered in an individual category but 
were addressed as part of our analysis of competition.  The 


























In 2004, the AACSB conducted a Strategic Management 
Survey of member schools.  In that survey, business school 
deans reported that the greatest pressures on their job 
came from managing faculty issues (cited by 74% of 
respondents), identifying and pursuing new funding sources 
(45%), and distinguishing their business school from 
competitors (24%). (Fairbank, Libanca, & LeClair, 2005)  
These results demonstrate the diverse elements of 
competition in the MBA market and illustrate why 
competitive rivalry is a critical important   market force 
in this industry.  They also highlight the areas of the 
competition that are the most prominent within this 
category: cost, revenues, and reputation. 
A. BUSINESS SCHOOL MISSION 
The business school mission includes two primary 
components: education and research. 
1. Education 
A typical core MBA curriculum can be seen in Figure 1. 
(Lathroum, 1998)  Among the top 10 MBA programs, the range 
of core (i.e., required) courses ranges from as few as 6 to 
as many as 16, with an average somewhere around 11.  The 
total MBA courses that students must complete at these 
programs range much more narrowly from 19 to 23. While 
course offerings at the different schools are generally 
similar (both inside and outside the core), the experiences 
of different MBA students can vary widely based on the 
elective courses they choose to take.  Moreover, the course 
offerings and content appear to be important to students 
given that a factor analysis conducted in 2006 showed that 
14 
the MBA curriculum has a profound impact on the perceived 
value of the MBA. (Syed, 2006)  
 
Figure 1.   MBA Representative Core Course Requirement 
 
While business schools consider it their mission to 
educate students for their entire career, they are under 
intense pressure from the business community to focus less 
on higher level long-term education and, instead, focus on 
short-term training on business practices. Other 
professional schools have faced this battle between 
education and the profession’s demand for vocational 
training.  Law schools, for instance, have said “No” to the 
profession’s suggestions that they should be providing more 
hands-on training and practical application skills that 
could help them pass the bar exam.  Law schools have 
instead opted for a model of education that prepares 
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students for a career in law vice their next job. (Dulek, 
1992) 
James Howell, co-author of the 1959 Gordon-Howell 
report, agrees with this logic, arguing that:  
A business school has to serve the profession, 
but that doesn’t mean that it should always do 
what the profession wants it to do.  Its 
obligations are to its students and to the 
profession as it’s emerging, not necessarily as 
it exists today.  I think it’s important that 
business schools stay some distance away from the 
business community.  Their primary responsibility 
is not to today’s business community; it’s to the 
business community of the future, and, in a more 
abstract sense, to society.  You’re trying to 
serve society through professional education… 
(Dulek, 1992)   
This speaks against the call for curriculum reform 
that typically leads to less vigorous, vocational type 
courses that focus on current trends in business and 
primarily teach students skills to be successful at their 
first job vice techniques that will equip them for a 
successful career. (Dulek, 1992)  
2. Research 
In 1959, the Gordon-Howell Report was published as the 
culmination of a series of reports and papers focused on 
surveying professional business education.  This report 
deduced that the American business education system was 
nothing more than a collection of trade schools that 
operated without reliance on any strong scientific 
foundation whatsoever. (Dulek, 1992) Overall, business 
schools were poorly regarded both on their own campuses and 
in business circles.(Dulek, 1992)  Herb Simon, a Nobel 
laureate, concluded, “Accurately or not, we perceived 
American business education at that time as a wasteland of 
16 
vocationalism that needed to be transformed into science-
based professionalism, as medicine and engineering had been 
transformed a generation or two earlier…”(Dulek, 1992)  
One of the first institutes to offer science-based 
graduate business education was the Graduate School of 
Industrial Administration (GSIA) at Carnegie Tech in 1949.  
Staffed largely with economists from the University of 
Chicago, GSIA produced an impressive portfolio of research 
and doctoral students.(Dulek, 1992)   GSIA’s first dean, 
Lee Bach, wrote in 1951,  
…business administration is a new profession.  It 
still operates heavily on rules of thumb and 
hunches, often unnecessarily so.  It is a 
profession that is growing up rapidly.  A crucial 
part of that growth must be the amassing of 
careful scientific analysis and research to lay 
bare what is hearsay in management, what is 
fundamental skill, and what is transient 
practice. I am personally convinced that careful, 
fundamental research in the management fields 
over the next half century can and will vastly 
improve our present knowledge and skills.(Dulek, 
1992)  
Echoing Mr. Bach’s concerns, the Gordon-Howell Report 
provided a recipe to change the perceptions held of the 
business schools:   
Collegiate business education should educate for 
the whole career and not primarily for the first 
job.  It should view the practice of business 
professionally in the sense of relating it to 
what we have in the way of relevant, systematic 
bodies of knowledge.  It should emphasize the 
development of basic problem-solving and 
organizational skills and socially constructive 
attitudes rather than memory of facts or training 
in routine skills.(Dulek, 1992)   
17 
By incorporating the suggestions in the Gordon-Howell 
Report, Graduate Business Education took a turn.  Leading 
business schools began investing heavily in science-based 
research faculty and doctoral programs to shift their focus 
from training to education. (Dulek, 1992)  They expanded 
heavily into doctoral education as well.  Schools began to 
recognize that having doctoral students serves three 
purposes: (1) doctoral students enhance faculty research 
efforts by assisting them and co-authoring topics; (2) 
teaching doctoral seminars motivates faculty to perform 
more and better research; and (3) most importantly, 
“doctoral students are the researchers and teachers of 
future generations.” (Dulek, 1992)   
Having shifted the focus from training to education 
and placing a greater emphasis on research, business 
schools completed a drastic turnaround. This turnaround 
helped to improve the perception of the MBA.  MBAs boomed 
from 3,200 in 1955-56 to over 102,000 in 1997-98; an annual 
compound growth rate of about 8.4 percent. (Dulek, 1992) In 
addition, business school faculties were publishing in 
prominent international social science journals. (Dulek, 
1992) 
Known for their research skills and analytical 
backgrounds, business schools added economists to their 
staff.  This new breed of faculty used its systematic 
bodies of knowledge to create new and inspiring curricula. 
Courses that relied on vocational, experience-based 
principles were replaced by courses that focused on problem 
solving and organizational skills.(Dulek, 1992)  Concepts 
such as the capital asset pricing model, the efficient 
markets hypothesis, game theory, linear programming models 
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for constrained resource allocation, and option pricing and 
risk management, which now serve as some of the staples of 
MBA curricula, came from basic research conducted decades 
earlier.  As one scholar noted: 
The latter practical application [of these basic 
research findings] followed in much the same way 
as nuclear power followed the basic theories of 
high-energy physics and Einstein’s theory of 
relativity, or as Watson and Crick’s basic 
research into the double helix structure of DNA 
led to today’s extensive applied research in 
genetic engineering.  Basic theoretical research 
precedes applied research.  Powering the boom of 
business education in the 1980s and 1990s was the 
highly abstract, then-impractical basic research 
of the 1960s and 1970s. (Dulek, 1992) 
This emphasis on fundamental, theoretical research 
caused a revolution in business education.  Instead of 
teaching facts about business, schools began to emphasize 
learning to think about business problems and situations.  
Business schools began to educate students vice train them. 
(Dulek, 1992) Now, in the wake of the successful shift from 
vocation to education, MBAs from top ranked schools are 
highly sought after by businesses, as noted professor James 
Howell is quoted as saying, “because of the theoretical, 
abstract intellectual approach that they bring.  They are 
the ones who come in with new ideas and see problems in 
different ways.” (Dulek, 1992)   
B. COSTS 
A surprising reality regarding the economics of 
graduate business education was expressed by Kenneth Dunn, 
dean of Carnegie Mellon's Tepper School of Business, when 
he observed, “You lose money on every MBA … My guess is 
that no top MBAs cover their cost, because you need 
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outstanding faculty to attract the students; to attract 
outstanding faculty, you need money to finance their 
research.” (Economist Staff, 2004) 
Figure 2 demonstrates the types of costs that a 
typical MBA program can expect to incur during normal 
business operation.  This figure was taken from the Annual 
Report of the Harvard Business School, however the relative 
breakdown of expenses is typical of major business schools.  
It is interesting to note that the salaries and benefits 
for faculty account for the majority of the costs, 
comprising 50 percent of the total expenditures. 
 
Figure 2.   Expense Components for the Harvard Business  
School, FY 2005 
 
 
The significant costs associated with graduate 
management education have left room for competitive entry 
by low cost providers. A decade ago, if you had asked 
business school deans what they thought would be the 
stiffest competition to residential MBA programs, they 
might have said private consulting firms or corporate 
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universities.  However, they are now facing the reality 
that they must compete with the low-cost providers who can 
turn a profit because they are not burdened with the high 
fixed costs of the “bricks and mortar” university.  These 
smaller for-profit companies are not tied to traditional 
campuses like the high-cost providers are.  Thus, they can 
reach markets that are too costly for the traditional MBA 
programs. (Bisoux, 2004) 
The problem facing the traditional high-cost 
management education providers is that to serve a shifting 
customer demographic, business schools must offer students 
real-world experience, greater access to information, 
expanded use of technology, a higher level of skill 
development, and more sophisticated global perspectives. 
(Westerbeck, 2004)  They are also forced to provide new 
services, including career placement assistance and 
convenient hours.  At the same time, they are trying to 
fund new facilities, building renovations, and upgrades to 
technology.  This is a costly set of requirements that 
require more resources and better-educated faculty.  The 
combination of these costs exceeds what tuition alone can 
cover. 
C. REVENUES 
Today, MBA programs are facing an increasingly complex 
funding scenario as traditional sources of funding are 
shrinking, requiring deans to spend more energy considering 
how to raise capital.  As Newman, Couturier, and Scurry 
(2004) observe, “the search for truth” in higher education 
institutions “is rivaled by a search for revenues.” (Gappa, 
Austin, & Trice, 2007)  At the same time, competition for 
faculty and students is intensifying, leading to higher 
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salaries and more money invested in recruitment. (Fairbank, 
Labianca, & LeClair, 2005)  Where is the money coming from?   
Despite what one might think, the majority of money 
isn’t coming from MBA tuition. Most traditional MBA 
programs, as well as universities in general, recognize 
that tuition alone will not cover the rising costs of 
employing faculty and paying for their research, much less 
all of the other costs previously discussed.  Figures 3 and 
4 provide a breakdown of revenues for a representative 
private (Harvard Business School) and public (University of 
Wisconsin) business school. 
Figure 3.   Revenue Components for the Harvard Business  
School, FY 2005 
 
 
At Harvard, tuition and fees only comprise 21 percent 
of the total revenue; at Wisconsin, tuition and fees only 
generate 37 percent of revenue, and that is with state aid 
subsidizing tuition.  These figures show that the vast 
majority of universities have to seek out other sources of 
revenue to stay out of the red.  Harvard and Wisconsin each 
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rely heavily on private funding and endowments, 21 percent 
and 21.9 percent respectively, to continue to operate. 
 
Figure 4.   Components of Revenue for the University of 
Wisconsin Business School 
 
 
In today’s market, most schools are forced to rely on 
endowments, donations from alumni, and contributions from 
companies with a vested interest in the institution’s 
success. (Economist Staff, 2004)  Melvin Stith, dean of 
Florida State University’s College of business, says, “Most 
[public] universities would say they get 50 cents on the 
dollar from state appropriations and make up the rest 
through philanthropy.” (MBA.com, 2005a)  GMAC’s Selections 
recently studied the naming gifts that business schools 
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received between 1998 and 2003.  Of this group, 13 schools 
received between $25 million and $62 million in 
donations.(Fields, 2006)  Since November 2001, BizEd has 
reported gifts of $20 million or more to six business 
schools, in addition to those cited in the Selections 
study.  The largest naming gift was $100 million and 
awarded by Stephen M. Ross to what is now the University of 
Michigan’s Ross School of Business.(Fields, 2006) 
In the same article, BizEd reported 11 gifts or grants 
ranging from $5 million to $17 million, and 37 gifts or 
grants ranging from $1 million to $5 million. (Fields, 
2006)  Of the 387 AACSB-accredited schools that responded 
to a 2002-2003 survey by AACSB Knowledge Services, almost 
10 percent had endowments exceeding $50 million.  Sixty 
percent, however, had endowments of $5 million or 
less.(Fields, 2006)  One study shows that philanthropic 
contributions to both public and private universities 
averages somewhere around $24 billion a year. (Tyson, 
Spring 03)  These studies clearly demonstrate the major 
role that gifts and endowments play in the school’s 
financial well-being.  
These philanthropic donations do more than just fund 
the business programs.  In some cases, these gifts can 
propel a program into the rankings.  This can have a 
profound effect on strategic growth.  The Sam Walton 
College of Business, after receiving a mega-gift of $50 
million, began to rise in U.S. News and World Report’s 
business school rankings and currently ranks as a top-50 




Business received a $30 million gift, it vaulted up the 
rankings, breaking into Business Week’s top-30 in 
2002.(Tyson, Spring 03) 
It seems that the only educational programs that are 
generating positive cash flow at business schools are the 
non-traditional MBA programs (i.e. part-time, executive 
education, and other types of hybrid MBAs). (Bisoux, 2006) 
At Harvard, executive education tuition contributed 23 
percent to the total revenue received in 2005.  At 
Wisconsin, executive education was 27 percent of their 
total revenues in 2005.   
Some traditional Business schools have also added the 
option of marketing their services to the external 
customers.  They can sell their instruction, information, 
and consulting services to other outside organizations, 
thus providing them some degree of independence from 
university and state support in meeting their budget 
shortfalls. (Bisoux, 2004)  Wisconsin attributed 21.9 
percent of their 2005 revenues to these activities.  This 
puts the advantage in favor of the larger, private schools 
that have a lengthy pedigree of alumni with resources to 
donate back to the institutions.   
Given the difficulties that these traditional programs 
have generating income, it is not surprising that the state 
funded institutions are facing increasing competition for 
financial aid from their respective states.  With more and 
more institutions seeking monetary relief, the supply of 
money is shrinking.  In fact, one AACSB publication noted 
that “23 states approved spending plans for higher 
education for the 2003-2004 fiscal year.  Each of these 
plans allocated less funding than in the previous year.  
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Thirteen states made similar cuts in 2002-2003, and five 
states did so in 2001-2002.” (Fields, 2006)  It is evident 
that this trend of decreasing funding does not bode well 
for the smaller, government funded programs.  With this 
glib picture of the MBA marketplace, one wonders why a 
university would offer the degree.  In fact, in many cases, 
offering a traditional MBA degree represents more of an 
investment in the school’s reputation than an effort to 
make a profit. (Bisoux, 2006) 
D. VERTICAL DIFFERENTIATION 
1. Rankings 
In 1988, Business Week published its first rankings of 
business schools.  Since then, four other sources have been 
publishing rankings: The Wall Street Journal, Financial 
Times, U.S. News and World, and Forbes.  In determining 
rankings, these publications take into account student 
surveys, a survey of corporate recruiters, faculty 
research, average undergraduate GPA, average GMAT scores, a 
survey of business school deans, acceptance rate 
(selectivity), starting salary and bonuses of graduates, 
placement percentage, salary increase for graduates, career 
progression of the students, diversity and international 
exposure, and alumni ratings.  See Figure 5 for a complete 
breakdown of which publications use what criteria for their 
rankings.  The publications take a combination of these 
statistics and formulate their rankings.  Students rated 
The Wall Street Journal, which ranks MBA programs 
exclusively on recruiter surveys, as the publication with 
the most credible rankings. (Schoenfeld & Bruce, 2005) 
An interesting fact about rankings is that, because of 
the differences in how they compile the rankings, the 
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publications do not always agree on how the MBA schools 
rank.  For instance, when The Wall Street Journal’s ranking 
first came out in 2001, it had Stanford at 45, whereas 
Business Week had Stanford at 11, and US News had Stanford 
at number 1. (Mast, 2001) 
 






Times U.S. News Forbes 
Student Surveys X     X   
Recruiter Surveys X X   X   
Graduate Surveys    X     
Faculty Published Research X   X     
Faculty With Doctorate    X     
Employment Upon Graduation     X X   
Employment 3 Months After Graduation     X X   
Salary & Bonus Upon Graduation    X X X 
ROI    X   X 
Gender Diversity    X     
International Diversity    X     
Average undergrad GPA       X   
Average GMAT Score       X   
Average Acceptance Rate       X   
Out of State Tuition & Fees       X   
Full-time Enrollment       X   
Applicant Ranking of Credibility   #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 
 
Figure 6 illustrates how these differences manifest 
themselves in the most recent Top Ten list of each 
publication.  The average correlation between the five 
surveys is only 0.46.(Zimmerman, 2001)  Since 1.00 shows 
complete correlation and 0.00 shows absolutely no 
correlation, this data indicates that there is relatively 
little correlation between the five publications and their 
rankings. 
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First published at a time when the vast majority of 
MBA programs failed to keep buyer opinions in mind, the 
original idea behind the rankings was to force MBA 
providers to be responsive to their primary constituents: 
students and employers.  The rankings therefore were 
intended to implement a system of reward and punishment to 
hold the universities accountable to their customers. 
(Mast, 2001) This system, has, in a sense, backfired.   
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Figure 6.   Publication’s Top Ten MBA Rankings 
 Recent Rankings of Top Ten MBA Programs by Various Publications 
 Business Week 2006 Financial Times 2007 US News 2006 
1 University of Chicago GSB 









3 Northwestern University (Kellogg) 
Harvard Business 
School 
Univ. of Pennsylvania 
(Wharton) 
4 Harvard Business School 
Stanford University 
GSB MIT (Sloan) 
5 University of Michigan (Ross) 




6 Stanford University GSB NYU (Stern) 
University of Chicago 
GSB 
7 MIT (Sloan) Darthmouth (Tuck) Columbia Business School 
8 UC Berkeley (Haas) Yale School of Management UC Berkeley (Haas) 
9 Duke University (Fuqua) MIT (Sloan) Darthmouth (Tuck) 
10 Columbia Business School UCLA (Anderson) UCLA (Anderson) 
 The Wall Street Journal 2006 Forbes 2005  
1 University of Michigan (Ross) Dartmouth (Tuck)  
2 Darthmouth (Tuck) Univ. of Pennsylvania (Wharton)  
3 Carnegie Mellon University (Tepper) 
University of Chicago 
GSB  
4 Columbia Business School 
Columbia Business 
School  
5 UC Berkeley (Haas) Yale School of Management  
6 Northwestern University (Kellogg) 
Stanford University 
GSB  
7 Univ. of Pennsylvania (Wharton) 
Harvard Business 
School  
8 UNC Chapel Hill (Kenan-Flagler) 
University of 
Virginia (Darden)  
9 Yale School of Management Cornell  
10 MIT (Sloan) Northwestern University (Kellogg)  
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Some schools have simply become obsessed with their 
position on the rankings, to the point of even firing deans 
who fail to produce desired improvements in position.(Mast, 
2001)  More than just endangering the jobs of b-school 
deans, this quest to top the list of MBA programs has put 
business schools in a jam. 
A number of observers have argued that these rankings 
lead some deans to focus on looking like a good school 
rather than being a good school.(Zimmerman, 2001)  Why 
wouldn’t they?  After all, the typical tour of duty for a 
dean lasts between five and ten years, so deans have strong 
incentives to focus on tactics to enhance short-term 
rankings rather than utilize resources on things like 
research and doctoral education that only yield dividends 
long after the dean has left office. (Zimmerman, 2001)  So, 
in trying to “look good,” deans shift a large percentage of 
resources to engineer the ranking of their full-time MBA 
programs.  Unfortunately, given the limited resources of 
most universities, this has robbed a large percentage of 
resources once devoted to undergraduate programs, 
curricular innovation and research.(Policano, 2005)  
In his compelling paper entitled “Can American 
Business Schools Survive?” Jerold Zimmerman states: 
This ratings race has caused schools to divert 
resources from investment in knowledge creation, 
including doctoral education and research, to 
short-term strategies aimed at improving 
rankings.  The resulting decline in business 
doctorates is creating a severe shortage of 
quality faculty.  American business schools are 
mortgaging their future; they are consuming their 
seed corn. (Zimmerman, 2001) 
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Before 1985, the top U.S. business schools were 
research-centric.  In fact, the quality of the business 
school’s reputation was driven by the quality of its 
research.(Zimmerman, 2001) “Schools with cutting-edge 
research attracted the best students and top young faculty, 
as well as gifts and grants, which enable them to retain 
existing faculty.” (Zimmerman, 2001) However, even though 
schools maintain a bias for research faculty, most MBA 
programs today face the reality that students and employers 
prefer teaching faculty over research faculty. (Zimmerman, 
2001)  
Consequently, one of the most common casualties of the 
resource reallocation that stems from the pursuit rankings 
is the business doctoral program. (Zimmerman, 2001)  As 
resources are rerouted to furnish new facilities and 
advertising agendas, the doctoral programs are starved.  
These programs have shrunk because there is no funding to 
continue the student stipends that draw in high-quality 
students, and professors are stripped of their financial 
resources to conduct research that brings in the new 
knowledge.   
More than financial resources are affected.  
Professors are also robbed of their time that is normally 
devoted to research because they are forced to maintain a 
larger teaching load.(Zimmerman, 2001)   Schools are 
actually asking professors to teach extra classes instead 
of performing the much needed research.(Zimmerman, 2001)  
Research is where the primary instruction for the doctoral 
students occurs.  The benefits for maintaining a doctoral 
program were already detailed in a preceding section of 
this chapter.  Without such programs, business schools risk 
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becoming stagnant in their ability to shape the leaders of 
tomorrow but, much worse, they lose their ability to 
educate the educators of tomorrow.   
To further illustrate this point, John Kraft, Chair of 
the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business 
(AACSB) and Dean of the University of Florida Business 
School, wrote that, “the top ten [business] Ph.D. producers 
have reduced by one-third the number of Ph.D.s produced 
annually compared to ten years ago … In the next ten years 
the number of Ph.D. graduates will approach 50% of the 
output of the 1990s in the face of increasing demand for 
faculty.” (Zimmerman, 2001)  Deans might encourage research 
that has a high level of visibility via the news media, but 
this is mainly to enhance the school’s standings in the 
rankings. (Zimmerman, 2001) 
Rankings have dramatically changed business education 
in other significant and perhaps undesirable ways: 
(Policano, 2005) 
• Higher GMAT requirements:  Higher GMAT scores for 
entrants translate into higher rankings.  
Therefore schools have raised entrance 
requirements. 
• Smaller Cohorts:  To compete against top tier 
school’s brand recognition, second and third tier 
schools have adopted a strategy of decreased 
class sizes.  This boosts the selectivity factor 
and possibly facilitates rankings increases, 
thereby attracting larger numbers of top 
students. 
• Overemphasis on paychecks:  This sends the 
message that the education, networking and 
quality of the program are not what is important.  
It implies that the salary after graduation is 
what is important.   
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• Shifts in Spending:  As schools divert money to 
improve rankings it weakens the quality of the 
learning environment. However more money for 
better faculty and better research facilities 
should also improve the learning environment.  
This presents a strategic dilemma of how business 
schools can balance between rankings and 
education in different ways to gain competitive 
advantage? 
• More frills less substance:  Business schools are 
adding student perks like fitness centers and 
extravagant décor, while neglecting classrooms 
and the learning environment. 
• Marketing Bonanzas:  AACSB conducted an informal 
survey that found 6 of 7 schools were undergoing 
major branding initiatives.  Five had actually 
contracted with external PR agencies.  These 
expenditures do not affect quality yet they 
likely increase rankings. 
 
Tom McQuillan, executive director of the MBA program 
at Temple University’s Fox School of Business commented on 
the focus on rankings:  
It’s an absolute top priority, because students 
take these rankings very seriously … There’s a 
tremendous amount of pressure to focus on the 
rankings, so it’s very easy to get distracted 
from the things you should be doing.  
Institutions which have enjoyed a positive 
ranking and who slip four of five slots start 
looking at all their practices — and that program 
may have been very successful to begin with. 
(Wuorio, 2001)  
 
So why pursue rankings at all?  It has already been 
mentioned that the rankings system isn’t a perfect science.  
Results are based on responses to a number of surveys, and 
not all of those given the surveys respond.  The five 
publications that publish rankings do not agree on who 
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should be in the top ten and in what order.  They do not 
even agree on which criteria should be considered in the 
rankings.   
Should it matter?  Do students care what goes into 
determining the rankings?  Most universities don’t even 
think that students read the ranking methodology. (Tyson, 
2001)  Shouldn’t students care how and why the school of 
their choices is ranked the way it is?  It isn’t like these 
rankings are movie reviews.  One author made an analogy to 
demonstrate the danger of treating these rankings as such: 
“We only spend several dollars per ticket and a few hours 
at a movie; a business school student invests a great deal 
of money, time, and effort in business school and, to some 
extent, banks a career on choosing the right school.” 
(Tyson, 2001) 
Regardless of whether or not the students understand — 
or even care to understand — the reasoning behind the 
rankings, the perception is that the higher ranked a 
school, the better it is.  Case in point: The University of 
Pennsylvania’s Wharton School was ranked number 1 by 
Business Week four times between 1993 and 2000.  During 
those same years, the applicant pool increased 
dramatically, from 4,300 in 1993 to 8,400 in 1999. (Wuorio, 
2001) In 2001, The Wall Street Journal ranked the Amos Tuck 
School of Business at Dartmouth number one.  As a result, 
application inquiries increased sixty percent in the year 
between September 2000 and 2001. (Wuorio, 2001)  In 
response to its ranking, Tuck’s dean Paul Danos said, “It 
certainly has an effect on the number of students choosing 
to come here.  But it also ratchets up everybody’s 
expectations.  Nobody wants to come to a place that’s 
34 
ranked 1 and leave when it’s at number 20.  And people who 
say they don’t care about that are being just a bit 
disingenuous.” (Wuorio, 2001)   
It isn’t just the spark to applications that drives 
the obsession with rankings.  Success in rankings is also 
tied to increases in alumni funding.  The Edwin L. Cox 
School of Business at Southern Methodist University was 
ranked 9th by The Wall Street Journal. This boosted alumni 
annual fund contributions by 150 percent in just a few 
years.  Besides opening their pocketbooks, alumni also 
opened their schedules by increasing their involvement in 
the two mentoring programs the business school provides for 
its students. (Wuorio, 2001)  This falls in line with the 
beliefs of one dean from a top-rated business school who 
stated, “The reality is that, independent of whether you 
believe rankings accurately reflect quality, the perception 
of the outside world is [that] it does and consequently 
resources flow to schools who are highly ranked.” 
(Zimmerman, 2001) 
The University of North Carolina’s James Dean, Jr., 
recognizes that this obsession with always vying for higher 
rankings has created an “arms race” of sorts among the 
business schools.  “The fact that once a school gets ranked 
highly, it can attract more students, resources, and 
faculty to remain near the top of the rankings only 
reinforces the idea that the rich get richer and the poor 
stay poor.” (Wuorio, 2001) 
The reason to drive for high rankings is the attempt 
to do one thing: develop a brand name.  Branding is a very 
important aspect of competition in the MBA market.  Sources 
say that establishing a brand name is one of the most 
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urgent matters facing business school deans.  The reasoning 
is tied back into rankings.  According to Martin Schatz, 
“…the rankings have a tendency to become self-fulfilling 
prophecies.” (Tyson, 2004)  The higher a school is ranked, 
the better it is perceived to be.  Therefore, the best 
potential students and faculty apply because they want to 
be a part of the best schools and, consequently, the school 
ends up producing the best graduates, partly because of the 
quality of the newly recruited faculty but mostly because 
of the high quality inputs (student applicants) in the 
first place. The higher the quality of graduates, the 
greater the school’s reputation among recruiters. Finally, 
because the quality of students (measured by GMAT scores, 
undergraduate GPA, and school acceptance rate), the quality 
of the faculty (measured by research productivity and 
percentage with doctorates), and the perception of 
recruiters (measured via survey) all factor into one or 
more of the published rankings, the school’s high ranking 
is reinforced or even improved.  Figure 7 illustrates this 
self-reinforcing virtuous cycle for those schools fortunate 
enough to be ranking highly in the various publication. 
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Figure 7.   The “Virtuous Cycle” of High Rankings 
 
 
Suffice it to say, if a school is known by its name to 
be a high-quality school, it will in fact be (or become) a 
high quality school. Furthermore, note that the virtuous 
cycle in Figure 7 holds true even if all MBA programs 
provided the exact same real educational benefit (in 
particular, the cycle would remain even if the arrow 
connecting high quality faculty to high quality graduates 
was removed from Figure 7).  In other words, the rankings 
may have very little to do with the actual quality of an 
MBA program and could instead be 100% the result of 
perception and, in particular, the rankings themselves. 
Moreover, note that the same dynamics which create the 
virtuous cycle for highly ranked schools in Figure 7 also 
create a self-reinforcing “vicious cycle” for poorly ranked 
schools.  This is illustrated in Figure 8, in which a low 
ranking leads to low quality student applicants and low 
quality faculty, which produces low quality graduates, 
which in turn produces a low quality perception among 
recruiters, which together reinforces or worsens the 
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school’s low ranking. Thus, it is also true that if a 
school is known by its name to be a low-quality school, it 
will in fact be (or become) a low quality school.  When it 
comes to MBA rankings, therefore, the rich get richer and 
the poor get poorer. 
 




The resulting incredible importance of perception in 
general and rankings in particular make the branding of 
business schools a key element in their ability to attract 
higher quality professors, students, and donors. (Fairbank 
et al., 2005)  Most schools are likely to undertake some 
sort of branding initiative as they seek to compete in this 
market.  The largest push is likely to come from newly 
founded international business schools and U.S. schools 
that have a regional or local community frame of 
reference.(Fairbank et al., 2005) U.S. Regional schools 
hope to distinguish themselves from competitors at the 
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local level, and thereby gain market share in a place 
typically dominated by smaller, local schools. (Fairbank et 
al., 2005)  
Beyond seeking higher standings in the rankings, 
schools have begun to seek other methods to establish brand 
identity.  Some AACSB-accredited schools in major markets 
are placing joint advertisements to distinguish themselves 
from non-accredited schools. (Fairbank et al., 2005)  Due 
to the growing reputation of non-U.S. business schools and 
the increasing demand for business education worldwide, 
more students are choosing to acquire business education 
from non-U.S. providers.  In addition, doctorally qualified 
faculties have a broader choice of highly regarded non-U.S. 
business schools than ever. (AACSB, 2002) 
2. Accreditation 
Accreditation is another means of setting MBA programs 
apart from others. There are 650 members in the AACSB. 
(Zimmerman, 2001)  For AACSB accreditation requirements, 
see Appendix A.  In the MBA industry, there are essentially 
three tiers of MBA programs.  There are the ranked 
programs.  Although the Top 20 are considered the elite, 
making the Top 50 is still an accomplishment.  Below the 
ranked schools are the non-ranked accredited programs.  
These are the less revered schools that have met the 
accreditation standards but cannot compete on the same 
level as the ranked schools.  Below the non-ranked 
programs, and at the bottom of the list, are the non-
ranked, non-accredited programs.  These are the programs 
that do not conform to widely accepted standards of what a 
business school and an MBA program should be and 
consequently cannot compete for rankings.  They are not 
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necessarily bad programs.  They could be brand new upstart 
programs that are in the process of gaining accreditation 
but have not yet done so.   
E. HORIZONTAL DIFFERENTIATION 
1. Specialization 
Because of the virtuous and vicious cycles that serve 
to reinforce overall rankings of “quality” in this market, 
there is little opportunity for accredited but unranked (or 
lower ranked) business schools to compete head-on with “big 
boys” and actually substantively improve their reputation 
based on overall quality.  Therefore, many MBA programs 
have looked for ways to compete via horizontal 
differentiation (i.e. specialization or focus) rather than 
vertical differentiation (i.e. overall quality to the mass 
market). 
The MBA market in the U.S. is an unregulated industry 
that allows schools to develop their own distinctive styles 
and personalities, as well as to define their own missions. 
Understandably, a level of “cutthroat” competition exists 
in this market that is second to none. (Dobni & Dobni, 
1996)  To succeed in such a competitive market, business 
schools have to capitalize on all available tools and 
technological resources to create their own competitive 
contexts or “niches” in which to compete.(Westerbeck, 2004)  
To create these unique competitive contexts, each school 
must look at the features it offers, from its faculty and 
programs to its schedule and delivery methods, and promote 
those that are most likely to draw attention.(Bisoux, 2006) 
The market wasn’t always like this.  The MBA that was 
offered by North American business schools in the 1980s was 
largely undifferentiated.  Due to the AACSB’s accreditation 
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requirements to cover a “common body of knowledge,” core 
and elective tracks rarely differed from campus to campus. 
(Schmotter, 2004)  During the 1990s, however, the “one-
size-fits-all” model was abolished due to immense pressure 
from stakeholders; the AACSB’s accreditation standards were 
revised, giving individual programs the flexibility to 
carve out niches in which they could operate. 
In some cases, a school might be particularly well 
known in certain elective areas, and this might drive 
students’ decisions to take those specific courses.  On the 
other hand, some schools decide to emphasize a specialized 
MBA that offers degrees in management with an emphasis in 
specific professional industries and disciplines, such as 
engineering or health care.  By shifting the focus toward 
these interdisciplinary degrees, schools can exploit 
existing strengths, carve out a new niche, and create 
clusters of excellence within the institution.(Fairbank et 
al., 2005)  The goal is to attract students with unique 
experience in certain professional areas by enabling them 
to earn an MBA specifically focused in that realm.  
It is understandable that schools are quick to market 
the fact that they were highly ranked.  Attaching a single 
number to a program has driven some to promote those 
elements that separate them from the others: outstanding 
faculty, ideal location, or outstanding parts of their 
curriculum.  JoAnne Starr, MBA program assistant at the 
Graduate School of Management, University of California at 
Irvine, agrees, noting that the pressure on schools to 
clearly delineate their strengths has grown with the 
popularity of various published rankings.  “You have to  
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clarify what makes you distinctive.  The question is, ‘Do 
we know what our core value is that we can promote to 
students?’” (Wuorio, 2001) 
Just because a school specializes in a particular 
field or curriculum doesn’t mean that it can’t benefit from  
published rankings.  The rankings in the Wall Street 
Journal, for example, identify the top three programs in a 
number of specialty areas, and a number of lesser-known 
schools have been able to make a name for themselves by 
appearing in these specialty rankings.  Babson College, for 
example, is ranked by the Wall Street Journal as the second 
best business school in the field of entrepreneurship, 
Thunderbird is ranked number one in international business, 
Purdue University is ranked number three in operations 
management, and the University of Texas is ranked number 
three in accounting. None of those four schools, on the 
other hand, were even included on the Wall Street Journal’s 
overall listing of top MBA programs, so it was only their 
specialization that enabled them to capture attention from 
the publication. 
Smaller publications have begun creating even more 
specialized MBA rankings.  Computerworld put out its fifth 
ranking of “techno MBA programs” in October 2001. (Wuorio, 
2001)  The rankings sought to determine which schools are 
putting out the best technology leaders.  (Wuorio, 2001)  
In 1997, Working Woman ranked the most female friendly MBA 
programs.  The report considered factors such as the 
school’s percentage of students and faculty that were 
women, the diversity of views in its curriculum, and the 
opportunities for female students and alumnae to 
network.(Wuorio, 2001)  Other publications that ranked 
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specialized MBA programs include Success Magazine (ranking 
entrepreneurial schools) and Hispanic Business (ranking the 
top ten schools for Hispanics). (Wuorio, 2001) 
2. Partnership 
Another approach to differentiate programs is to form 
partnerships with proven business organizations and infuse 
their methodologies into the program curriculum.  Columbia, 
which ranks No. 10, offers a new MBA called the Program for 
Social Intelligence.  This program combines aspects of the 
proven management philosophies of such corporate giants as 
General Electric and Goldman Sachs, including brainstorming 
exercises and marketing plan simulations, and forms the 
program around them.  (Lavelle & Lehman, 2006)  Another 
avenue of specialization is offering an MBA with an 
international focus.  More than 400 international business 
programs are currently available in the U.S., up from less 
than 200 a decade ago. (AACSB, 2002)   
3. Regional Focus and Flexibility 
Not all schools have the means to completely revamp 
their curriculum. Instead, some instead simply shift the 
target customer of their programs. 
Typically, small schools have had success attracting 
local students who do not want to travel too far from home.  
They offer convenience to working professionals who live 
nearby.  To students who simply appreciate the advantages 
of a safe, comfortable environment where they can get close 
attention, small schools offer the solution. (Shinn, 2004a)  
This trend towards regional focus has led the Wall Street 
Journal to include a ranking of the top 50 regional MBA 
programs in addition to its rankings of national and 
international programs. 
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By being sensitive to students’ rigorous and demanding 
work and family schedules, schools can reach a certain 
student population that needs creative program alternatives 
in terms of scheduling and content.(Bisoux, 2006)  Some 
schools are shortening their programs to attract students 
who have neither the freedom nor the ability to devote 24 
months to earning an MBA degree.  This trend is catching 
on.  In 2003, 37 percent of member programs took 21 to 22 
months to complete; in 2005, that number dropped to 27 
percent.  Programs that take 17-18 months to complete, 
however, increased to 17 percent of members in 2005, up 
from 15 percent in 2003.(Bisoux, 2006)   With intense 
competition for students and MBA providers desperately 
trying to maintain market share, on the other hand, there 
is a danger of designing programs that fall short of what 
an MBA program should be.  MBA providers must therefore be 
careful about the degree to which they specialize or 
customize their MBA programs. 
F. ANALYSIS 
For better or worse, it is evident that competition 
for rankings currently drives the MBA industry.  
Universities expend vast resources in the pursuit of being 
highly ranked or even ranked at all.  Rankings drive how 
students, faculty, and employers perceive the MBA program.  
In turn, how students, faculty, and employers perceive the 
MBA program drives rankings.  However, rankings do not 
necessarily equate to the value of the education.   
Just because one person went to the Harvard Business 
School and another went to a small, non-ranked school 
doesn’t mean the education was less valuable. In fact, 
rankings may reveal very little about the actual quality of 
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the education.  All rankings reveal is what the average GPA 
and GMAT score is for its students, how many applicants the 
program turned away, average salary upon graduation for its 
graduates, how much research is published by the faculty, 
etc.  Nowhere in the rankings is there a category for 
“quality of the education.”  The reason, many argue, is 
that an MBA has similar “real” intellectual value no matter 
where it comes from.  MBA programs differ, without 
question.  But in the end, many observers suggest that an 
MBA is an MBA.   
Unfortunately for the students who attend a non-ranked 
school, there is a strong perception that a difference in 
the quality of the education exists.  It is this perception 
that drives schools to compete as hard as they do for 
rankings in effort to establish themselves as “value 
leaders.”  
The Top 20 schools in any published ranking generally 
stay the Top 20, although the order may shift slightly from 
year-to-year.  It is primarily the legacy of these schools 
that keeps them at the top.  In recognition of this 
relative permanency in the rankings, some publications have 
even been accused of changing the weighting of their 
criteria slightly each year simply to create small changes 
in the rankings that could help sell more magazines. 
The static and impenetrable nature of business school 
rankings therefore leaves little room for newcomers or 
small schools to make a big splash.  Non-ranked programs 
thus do all kinds of things to set themselves apart from 
the rest of the pack, especially small programs that do not 
have access to the vast resources that the larger schools 
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have.  The reason is because, ultimately, whether they are 
ranked or not, they have to get students in the chairs.   
As mentioned above, a few tactics exist to do this.  
Some have begun to revamp their curriculum, trying to offer 
more of what students want.  Some have reduced “education” 
in favor of “training” to offer more of what employers 
want.  This is because MBA programs are torn between 
meeting the desires of the students that want to gain 
knowledge that will help them throughout their management 
career and the employers that want MBA graduates to hit the 
ground running with basic applied business skills 
appropriate for an early-career position. 
Other schools have decided to specialize in a 
particular profession, creating a niche market inside the 
broader MBA market.  As mentioned, Thunderbird is ranked 
first among MBA programs offering MBAs in international 
business and Babson College is ranked second in the field 
of entrepreneurship.  Other schools specialize in medical 
MBAs or IT MBAs.  Still others have decided to seek a 
regional strategy to create a brand.  They seek to be the 
university for the local students that do not want to 
travel too far from home or are working professionals that 
have to work the MBA around their careers.  Whatever the 
case, since breaking into the Top 20 (or even the top 50, 
in most cases) is virtually impossible, these programs have 
sought other avenues to set themselves apart. 
The other aspect of the MBA industry that stands out 
is the fact that it is an expensive business.  The rising 
salaries of professors and the rising costs of research are 
key contributors to the increasing costs.  Tuition alone 
will not cover the costs of running an MBA program.  The 
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primary source of funding is donations and endowments from 
alumni.  The schools that are the most successful are those 
that have been around a while and have long lines of alumni 
that are willing and able to give back to their alma 
maters.  Even then, the big schools still utilize executive 
education, consulting services, and research projects to 
provide additional revenue.  New programs or small ones do 
not have the lineages that may allow them to supplement 
their revenues in these ways and thus, consequently, they 
are even more at a disadvantage.  These new and small MBA 
program also pursue additional avenues of funding but also 
must compete with other small schools for government 
funding that is diminishing year by year.  Raising 
necessary funds is a problem that all MBA programs must 
deal with, and it will continue to compound.  
To be a player in the MBA industry, a MBA program 
needs access to adequate revenue sources.  Without it, it 
will be difficult to put together a program that carries 
any credibility.  The next step is to earn accreditation.  
After that, it is necessary to decide if the program will 
compete for rankings in the overall MBA industry or if the 
program will seek out a niche strategy through 
specialization or a regional focus.  Once that decision is 
made, it is simply a matter of hiring faculty and getting 
students to apply and come to the program.  A program must 
maintain a long-term mindset.  Being competitive in the MBA 
industry is not a sprint; it is a marathon.  A program 
cannot be Harvard or Dartmouth in a year.  It is about 
paying dues and making a name for the program with quality 




Depending on your perspective, the buyers of graduate 
management education are either the students, employers, or 
both.  No matter the classification of these two different 
stakeholder groups, however, an effective industry analysis 
requires understanding the incentives and leverage of both 
groups. 
A. STUDENTS 
Students at MBA programs have waited an average of 62 
months — or a little more than 5 years — between completing 
their undergraduate (first university) degree and enrolling 
in a graduate business program.  Most MBA students did not 
even consider an MBA degree until about 3 years had passed 
since their undergraduate degree.  (MBA.com, 2005b) Then, 
it typically takes about one and a half years before 
they’ll actually apply to a graduate program after first 
considering graduate education. People applying to full-
time 2-year MBA programs submitted an average of 3.2 
applications.(MBA.com, 2005b)  After applications are 
submitted, about a month passes on average before an 
attempt to score highly on the Graduate Management 
Admission Test (GMAT) is made.  Finally, six months after 
the GMAT is completed, a student typically enrolls in one 
of the graduate business programs that have accepted 
him/her.(MBA.com, 2005b) 
1. GMAT 
Before a student’s first tuition payment is due, 
he/she must decide which program is right for them.  This 
is important because simply applying to a program can cost 
between $100 and $200 per application. A Graduate 
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Management Admission Test (GMAT) can cost upwards of $200. 
(Tyson, Spring 03)  Costs are more than monetary.  Students 
preparing for the GMAT spend an average of 97 hours 
preparing for the test. (MBA.com, 2005b)  
According to a 2005 survey of 155 two-year business 
schools, the median average GMAT score among the schools 
was 592 (out of 800), with the 75th percentile being 640, 
and the bottom 25th percentile being 526.(AACSB, 2006b)   
Figure 9 shows how GMAT scores have changed over the last 
fifty-three years. 
 
Figure 9.   GMAT Data, Then vs. Now 
Category 1954 2002 
GMAT volume at year-end 2,553 249,632 







GMAT mean score 500 528 
 
The GMAT examination is a standardized test designed 
to measure basic verbal, mathematical, and analytical 
writing skills that have been developed over a long period 
of time through education and work. (139, p 1)  GMAT scores 
consistently outperform undergraduate GPA or any other 
quantitative measure as a predictor of academic success in 
MBA programs. (GMAC, 2006c)  The best predictor of academic 
success, however, is achieved when GMAT factors are 
combined with undergraduate GPA. (GMAC, 2006c)  The data 
show that the GMAT exam has exceptionally high “predictive 
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validity” for most MBA programs.  When one considers the 
range of variables that can have an effect on a student’s 
First Year Average, such as motivation, job considerations, 
family considerations, course preferences, professor 
preferences, teaching quality, and grading quality, the 
predictive validity of these core admission data is quite 
impressive. 
2. Admissions 
In 2001, the majority (three-fourths) of MBA students 
had at least three years of pre-MBA work experience, 
(Edgington & Olkin, 2002) and experience continues to 
become an important aspect of admission criteria. (Conley, 
2002) Many schools will take a chance on someone with 
minimal work experience, but schools also recognize that 
prior experience is associated with the ability to get a 
job after graduation, which is a big factor in determining 
rankings.(Conley, 2002)  Regardless, the trend seems to be 
a drive toward recruiting younger and younger applicants.  
The intent is to pick up the stellar students before they 
get locked into a career from which they cannot take 2 
years off when they become 27 or 28. (Mast, 2002) 
Overall, MBA admissions is considered an art. “It 
would be nice if admissions were a science,” says Linda 
Meehan, once an assistant dean and executive director of 
admissions and financial aid at Columbia Business School.  
“It would be nice to be able to rely on the GMAT score and 
not look at anything else.  That would be easy, but it 
wouldn’t give us what we are looking for, because what we 
are looking for is not measured in numbers only.” (Fisher, 
2002) While most schools look beyond GMAT scores, they also 
recognize the importance of the GMAT in assessing academic 
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aptitude and the ability to handle a tough 
curriculum.(Mast, 2002)  When you combine GMAT scores with 
GPA, course work, letters of recommendation, interviews, 
and essays, you can glean a pretty precise image of a 
student’s abilities.(Tyson, 2002)  Whatever the combination 
a school uses to determine admissions, the fact of the 
matter is that it is “an inherently and necessarily 
subjective process” that requires choosing between 
individuals who are equally qualified.(Tyson, 2002)  
According to Jett Pihakis, once the director of 
domestic admissions for the Haas School of Business at the 
University of California, Berkeley, “It would be nice if 
there were one ideal applicant, however we’d have a class 
more homogenous than heterogeneous — and that is not what 
we want.” (Mast, 2002) 
Despite the stated desire for a heterogeneous student 
mix, most business schools do look for common traits, 
including academic prowess, initiative, leadership 
potential, ability to work in teams, and top-notch 
communication skills.(Mast, 2002)   A former director of 
MBA admissions and financial aid at the Wharton School of 
Business was quoted as saying, “I don’t want a class full 
of investment bankers or consultants.  I also want 
nontraditional students: people who have worked in 
government or the nonprofit world.  The mix is what makes 
for an incredible learning environment.” (Mast, 2002)  
There are many reasons students choose to pursue an 
MBA, which is why self-assessment is so important.  A 
prospective student needs to investigate the program and 
find the one that best fits their distinct personal 
attributes. (Mast, 2002) 
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When individuals who were not enrolled in an MBA 
program but who had attended an MBA forum a year earlier 
were asked why they weren’t currently attending an MBA 
program, the number one reason given was that the MBA 
program of their choice rejected them.  The distant runner-
up was that they were not satisfied with their GMAT. 
(Edgington & Olkin, 2002) Nonetheless, the process of self-
selection, or deciding to pursue an MBA and which programs 
to apply to, is probably a stronger determinant of the type 
of students that end up at a particular school than is the 
school’s selection process. (Edgington & Olkin, 2002) 
3. Program Selection Criteria 
After deciding to pursue an MBA and taking the GMAT, 
students must narrow the choices of programs to which they 
will apply. Students are also becoming more and more brand 
conscious, but they aren’t convinced simply by reputation 
that a school is high quality.   
The following characteristics were listed as those 
that ranked highly when choosing the right program: 
• Prestige and global recognition; 
• Career options the school affords; 
• Quality and reputation of the faculty; 
• Rankings in publications; and 
• Reputation of alumni. (Olkin, 2004) 
See Figure 10 for a full ranking of criteria that 
students felt were important when choosing an MBA program.  
The quality of the school’s curriculum, satisfaction 
with an increase in long-term potential through the 
development of skills and abilities, and the quality of the 
faculty provide the greatest explanatory power in 
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understanding how a student rates the overall value of the 
MBA degree.(GMAC, 2006b) To understand student satisfaction 
with the increase in long-term potential through the 
development of skills and abilities, one study conducted a 
survey and formed a regression analysis to determine which 
skills and abilities affect their satisfaction in relation 
to the others.(GMAC, 2006b)   Improvements in the ability 
to think strategically are most likely to affect a 
student’s satisfaction with long-term potential. (GMAC, 
2006b) 
Another survey asked prospective students to rank 
categories of key aspects in their school selection 
process.  Figure 11 demonstrates the results of this 
survey.   
Finally, for categories ranked one, two, or three in 
the previous survey, respondents received a question asking 
them to rate the importance of detailed criteria within the 
category. (Schoenfeld & Bruce, 2005)  Figure 12 
demonstrates the results of this survey.  Quality of the 
faculty emerges as the most important criterion used by 
perspective students in selecting a graduate business 
school, followed by the local respect and reputation of the 
school, and the program types offered.(Schoenfeld & Bruce, 
2005)  Another study showed that one of the most powerful 
drivers of satisfaction with the school is the presence of 
a close-knit community.  This aspect was important to all 
respondents, regardless of whether they were enrolled in a 




Figure 10.   School Selection Criteria 
School Selection Criteria 
Percent 
Criteria (n = 5,253) 
Quality/reputation of the school 75% 
Quality/reputation of the faculty 66% 
Prestige or global recognition of the school 64% 
It is an accreditation program 62% 
The school's reputation in placing graduates in jobs 60% 
Career options available to graduates 58% 
Financial cost of school 56% 
Availability of scholarships, grants or other financial aid 55% 
Published rankings of its graduate management program 52% 
Improved chances for an international career 51% 
School offers the specific curriculum I wanted 49% 
The students and faculty have diverse backgrounds and experience 49% 
School offers a practice-oriented education 44% 
Cost of living is affordable 43% 
Reputation of alumni 43% 
The school is close to employment opportunities 38% 
Convenient class schedules 37% 
The school is close to home or work 29% 
The school provides the opportunity to learn/improve a foreign 
language 26% 
There are people like me at this college or university 25% 
The school is in an exciting city 23% 
My employer will pay for my education at this school 18% 
Personal experience as an undergraduate 18% 
Other 4% 
Responses may add to more than 100% due to multiple selections. 




Figure 11.   Importance of School Selection Criteria 
Program Type Total 
Full-Time Part-Time Executive 
 
Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank 
It was an accredited program 4.1 1 4.3 1 4.4 1 4.2 1 
Quality/reputation of the faculty 4.0 4 3.9 5 4.1 3 4.0 2 
Prestige or global recognition of 
the college or university 
4.0 3 3.8 6 4.0 6 4.0 3 
Location of the college or 
university 
3.8 8 4.3 2 4.1 4 3.9 4 
Career options available to 
graduates 
4.0 2 3.5 9 3.3 11 3.9 5 
Published rankings of its graduate 
management program 
3.8 5 3.6 8 3.6 9 3.8 6 
School offered the specific 
curriculum I wanted 
3.8 7 3.7 7 3.9 7 3.8 7 
Local respect 3.6 10 4.0 4 4.0 5 3.7 8 
The school’s reputation in placing 
graduates 
3.8 6 3.2 12 3.0 13 3.6 9 
The students and faculty had 
diverse backgrounds and experience 
3.6 9 3.2 11 3.6 8 3.5 10 
Source: School Brand Images and Brand Choices in MBA 
Programs 
 
Figure 12.   Top Ten Standardized Ratings of Specific 
Criteria within Key Aspects 
Specific Criterion Rank Standardized 
Score 
Quality of the faculty 1 4.24 
Local respect/reputation 2 4.12 
Program type offered 3 4.01 
Rigor of academic program 4 3.97 
Quality of current students 5 3.89 
Published ranking of its graduate management 
program 
6 3.87 
Successful alumni 7 3.86 
Job placement reputation of the school 8 3.78 
Program completion time 9 3.75 
Selectivity of admissions 10 3.67 
*The highest ranked category for each respondent is given a score of 3, the next 
highest is given a score of 2, and the third highest is given a score of 1.  Each 
specific piece of information is recorded where 6 equals extremely important and 0 
equals not at all important.  Next, a computed score is derived by multiplying the 
rank with the component scores for each respondent.  Each of the computed scores is 
the weighted by the overall percentage of respondents similarly ranking the overall 
categories.  Finally, the arithmetic mean is calculated fore each component. 







4. Value of an MBA 
How do you judge the value of an MBA?  One way is to 
look at Return-on-Investment (ROI).  When you consider that 
an MBA is an investment into your future, using ROI to 
calculate the value of your investment makes perfect 
senses.  On study did just that.   
To determine the ROI numbers for a potential MBA 
graduate, total estimated costs were obtained by adding 
together the published data for each school’s tuition and 
fees plus the pre-MBA salaries given up (multiplied by two 
plus an added U.S. average salary increase for the second 
year number).  Post-MBA salaries were obtained through 
survey data supplied by surveys taken from MBA Alumni 
groups.  The 10-year gain from an MBA was then calculated 
before taxes and adjusted for the time value of 
money.(Holtom & Inderrieden, 2006) See Figure 13 for the 
overall numbers. 
Figure 13.   Overall Numbers 
Overall Numbers 
Pre-MBA Salary $51,857 
Post-MBA Salary $78,745 
Total Cost $121,641
Net Increase in Salary $26,888 
Percent Increase in Salary 52% 
10-Year Gain from MBA $337,105
Return on Investments (ROI) 177% 
Annualized ROI 18% 
Payback Period (years) 4.5 
 
Figure 14 shows how top ten schools compare to non-top 
ten schools in these categories.  Graduates from schools 
outside the Top 10 experienced increases in salary that 
were nearly equal to the Top 10 (54 percent vs. 56 percent, 
respectively).  Moreover, given that the costs of the Top 
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10 programs were higher (both in tuition and opportunity 
cost of foregone salary), the ROI was lower and the payback 
period for graduates of the Top 10 programs was longer by 
15 months on average. 
 
Figure 14.   Impact of Top 10 Ranking 
Variable Top 10 Not Top 10 
Pre-MBA Salary $61,935 $51,619 
Post-MBA Salary $96,420 $79,703 
Total Cost $198,321 $123,712 
Net Increase in Salary $34,485 $28,084 
Percent Increase in Salary 56% 54% 
10-Year Gain from MBA $432,348 $352,103 
Return on Investments (ROI) 118% 185% 
Annualized ROI 12% 18% 
Payback Period (years) 5.8 4.4 
 
For specific schools, the payback period can be as 
long as 14 years.(Holtom & Inderrieden, 2006; Holtom & 
Inderrieden, 2006)  To provide a broader comparison, the 
study also examined the outcomes achieved by graduates from 
the Top 50 schools vs. those outside the Top 50.  Figure 15 
provides the results of this comparison.   
 
Figure 15.   Impact of Top 50 Ranking 
Variable Top 50 Not Top 50 
Pre-MBA Salary $53,019 $50,680 
Post-MBA Salary $83,736 $73,448 
Total Cost $141,717 $95,777 
Net Increase in Salary $30,718 $22,768 
Percent Increase in Salary 58% 45% 
10-Year Gain from MBA $385,116 $285,452 
Return on Investments (ROI) 172% 198% 
Annualized ROI 17% 20% 
Payback Period (years) 4.6 4.2 
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Oddly enough, the ROI is higher and the payback period 
is shorter for graduates of programs outside the Top 50.  
These results indicate that students at lower tier MBA 
programs actually enjoy a higher return on their investment 
than students at higher tier schools. Note, however, that 
it is important to consider selection effects when 
interpreting these results: the students at lower tier 
schools differ from students at higher schools, most 
importantly in terms of their foregone pre-MBA salary. 
Therefore the results of this analysis can not be 
interpreted to suggest that a lower tier school is a better 
investment for all students. 
A different study estimated the total ROI as of 2006 
that had been achieved by the MBA classes of 2000 to 2005.  
The mean percentage of investment that MBA graduates had 
recouped was 45%, 54%, 60%, 67%, 71%, and 77%, from 2000 to 
2005 respectively.(GMAC, 2006c) Another survey asked 
graduates if pursuing an MBA degree was the right decision, 
most respondents said they definitely made the correct 
decision. (GMAC, 2006c) 
According to the Council of Graduate Schools, the 
number of master’s degrees granted in the U.S. has 
increased 61 percent since 1984.  Business degrees are 
second only to education as far as master’s degrees being 
awarded and are quickly on the rise.  The number of MBAs 
given in 2000 was 46 percent greater than that number given 
in 1990. (Fisher, 2002) 
Because demand for the MBA degree is driven by many 
factors including the real as well as perceived value, we 
end this section by examining graduates’ perceptions of the 
value of the degree.  Specifically, they were asked: When 
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you compare the total monetary cost of your MBA program to 
the career opportunities you have received as a result of 
obtaining your degree, how would you rate the overall value 
of your MBA degree?  The results are presented in Figure 
16.  
 






Top 10 1.63 
Not Top 10 2.18 
Top 50 2.08 
Ranking 
Not Top 50 2.28 
Legend: 
When you compare the total monetary cost of your MBA program to the 
career opportunities you have received as a result of obtaining your 
degree, how would you rate the overall value of your MBA degree? 
a. Outstanding  1             d. Fair    4 
b. Excellent    2             e. Poor    5 
c. Good         3 
Source: Examining the Value Added by Graduate     
Management Education, 2006 
 
Graduates of full-time programs were the most upbeat, 
followed by executive MBAs and part-timers.  It is also 
interesting to note that, despite the earlier analysis 
indicating that students at lower tier MBA program enjoy a 
higher return on their investment, graduates from top 10 
schools rated the overall value of their MBA degree 
significantly higher than did graduates from schools 
outside the top 10.(Holtom & Inderrieden, 2006) 
Finally, to help us understand what it is about the 
MBA that generates such high satisfaction among graduates, 
Figure 17 shows graduate ratings of satisfaction with 
specific aspects of the MBA degree. 
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Figure 17.   Satisfaction with Aspects of the MBA Degree 
Aspect Satisfaction 
Rating 
Job Security 2.64 
Increase in work environment flexibility 2.04 
Preparation to get a good job in the 
business world 
2.00 
Opportunity to network and to form 
relationships with long-term value 
1.96 
An increase in earning power 1.90 
Opportunity for quicker advancement 1.86 
Development of your management 
knowledge/technical skills 
1.74 
Credentials you desired 1.74 
An increase in your career options 1.70 
Opportunity to improve yourself 
personally 
1.59 
Legend: Extremely Satisfied = 1; Very Satisfied = 2; Somewhat Satisfied = 3;  
Not Very Satisfied = 4; Not at all Satisfied = 5 




Another common way to look at the value of an MBA is 
too look at the salary received following the attainment of 
the degree. Corporate recruiters surveyed by GMAC from 
2002-2006 were asked to estimate the starting annual salary 
for their new professional hires from MBA schools relative 
to other graduate programs.  On average, starting annual 
salaries for MBA graduates was $11,000 more than other 
graduates. (Murray, 2006) On the other hand, another study 
demonstrated that employees who have been in the workforce 
longer earn significantly more per year than those who 
recently graduated with an MBA. 
According to one study the mean 2006 annual salary for 
MBAs who had graduated in years 2000 to 2005, was $107,694, 
$101,319, $90,263, $87,874, $82,578, and $82,466 
respectively. (GMAC, 2006b)  This shows that the longer an 
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MBA is in the work force, the higher their salary is.  In 
five years, an MBA can expect an increase of approximately 
130 percent in salary.  The same trend can be seen in the 
average total compensation package. The mean total 
compensation package in 2006 for MBA graduates who had 
graduated in the years 2000 to 2005 was $157,821, $134,759, 
$113,347, $113,208, $109,161, and $104,888, respectively. 
(GMAC, 2006c)  
The economic benefit enjoyed by a graduate business 
degree recipient was $659,726 as compared to that of the 
average graduate degree recipient with a value of $254,085. 
(Committee on Issues in Management Education, 2005) 
Benefits of an MBA include: higher starting salary, greater 
compensation growth, more stable long-term employment, and 
a higher likelihood of participating in the workforce.  In 
2001, the lifetime earning power of the “average” MBA was 
about $550,000 greater than the average college graduate. 
From 1992-2002, in the U.S., the average compensation for 
each MBA grew from $56,000 after completing their degrees 
to $387,600 (including bonuses and other compensation) 
after ten years.  This is compared to the $43,000 average 
salary for those with a non-management college degree. 
(Committee on Issues in Management Education, 2005) 
Figure 18 shows a graph of average annual base salary 
among MBA graduates who have received or accepted an offer 
of employment, while Figure 19 presents a comparison of 
starting annual salaries for MBA and non-MBA graduates from 
2002-2006. 
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Figure 18.   Average Base Salary among MBA Grads who 
Received/Accepted Offer of Employment 
































MBA.com Registrants Survey Comprehensive Data Report, 2005 
 
Figure 19.   Estimated Starting Salary for New Hires  
Year-to-Year Comparison 
U.S. Dollars (Mean) 
New Hire 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
From MBA Program  $72,021 $73,859 $77,066 $78,040  $80,809 
From other  
graduate program  $52,322 $56,518 $62,371 $60,865  $65,780 
From undergraduate 
program  $41,381 $42,936  $45,029 $45,652  $46,436 
Source: MBA Alumni Perspectives Survey, April 2006 
 
The total additional compensation package for new MBA 
hires has an additional value of $18,928. (GMAC, 2006a) 
Students who responded to yet another survey reported 
that they made, on average, an annual salary of $61,302 
before entering the MBA program.  They expect to earn an 
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average annual salary of $86,350 upon graduation.  This 
represents a 41 percent increase.(GMAC, 2006b)   Also asked 
was if the graduating students were receiving a signing 
bonus.  Almost half (47%) expect to receive some form of 
signing bonus of somewhere around $15,457. Figure 20 shows 
salary and bonus statistics for MBA graduates with various 
levels of work experience prior to entering the MBA 
program. (GMAC, 2006b) 
 
Figure 20.   Salaries and Bonuses for Respondents who    
Accepted a Job Offer, by Work Experience 
Annual Base Salary 
and Signing Bonus 
Less than 
3 years 
3 years, but 
less than 6 
years 
6 or more 
years 
Annual base salary 
earned before 
starting MBA 
$40,349 $51,718 $75,529 
Annual base salary 
expected in first 
job after 
graduation 
$68,399 $81,710 $100,887 
Pre- and post-MBA 
difference ($) 
$28,050 $29,992 $25,358 
Pre- and post-MBA 
difference (%) 
70% 58% 34% 
Percentage expect 
to receive signing 
bonus 
44% 55% 43% 
Amount of signing 
bonus* 
$10,736 $16,256 $17,521 
*p<.05; Items in bold in the contingency table significantly affect 
the overall X2 statistic. 
Source: Global MBA Graduate Survey, 2006 
 
Another consideration for MBA students is how to pay 
for the education.  Figure 21 shows just how prospective 
students plan on funding their MBA.  The results reveal 
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that the majority of students plan on getting loans to 
cover the costs of graduate education.(MBA.com, 2005a)  
Figure 21.   Method of Financing Graduate Management 
Education 
Method of Financing Graduate Management Education 
(Average Percent of Education Financed by Each Student) 
Enrolled/ 
Admitted 
Financial Source n = 1,188 
Loans 27% 
Employer reimbursement/sponsorships* 17% 
Grants, fellowships, scholarships* 15% 
Personal Earnings* 13% 
Support from parents* 13% 
Personal Savings 11% 
Spouse's (partner's) earnings 2% 
Other 2% 
Total 100% 
*p < 0.05; Items in bold represent significant differences based on Bonferroni 
comparison in an ANOVA. 
Source: Global MBA Graduate Survey, 2006 
 
When asked whether or not earning the MBA degree was 
worth the price and if they would do it all over again, 
knowing what they know now, a remarkable 72 percent said 
“definitely yes.”  The rest of those survey results can be 
seen in Figure 22. (MBA.com, 2005a) 
 
Figure 22.   Right Decision to Pursue the MBA Degree 
Knowing what you know now, 
would you still have 
pursued an MBA Degree? 
Full-Time 
(n = 2,828) 
Definitely yes 72% 
Probably yes 22% 
Probably no 4% 
Definitely no 1% 
Total 100% 
Source: MBA.com Registrants Survey, 2005 
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Figure 23 shows the results of a survey of 3,415 
individuals considering an MBA concerning their motivation 
for choosing to pursue management education.  The number 
one motivator was the hope that the MBA would provide an 
opportunity for more challenging/interesting work in the 
future.   
 
Figure 23.   Motivation to Pursue a Graduate Management 
Education 
Motivation to Pursue a Graduate Management Education 




My Reason for pursuing graduate management education is 
because it will… 
(n = 3,415) 
Provide me an opportunity for more challenging/interesting work in 
the future* 67% 
give me a sense of personal satisfaction and achievement* 61% 
be a part of my planned career development* 59% 
improve my long term income and financial stability* 57% 
allow me to remain marketable (competitive)* 57% 
allow me to obtain the professional credentials I need for 
advancement* 56% 
provide me the right connections to get a good job in the future* 46% 
help me develop the skills necessary to do my job* 46% 
allow me to transition from my current career path to a new one* 41% 
help me to develop the confidence I need to succeed* 40% 
help me achieve my goal of starting my own business* 34% 
allow me to change occupational area* 31% 
help me get the respect I deserve at work* 26% 
*p < 0.05; Items in bold significantly affect the overall X2 statistics of the contingency 
table. 
Source: Global MBA Graduate Survey, 2006 
 
Figure 24 shows the results of a survey of the same 
3,415 potential MBA students asking about their 
reservations, if any, about pursuing an MBA degree.  The 
number one concern was related to affordability.  
65 
 
Figure 24.   Reservations about Pursuing Graduate 
Management Education 
Reservations about Pursuing a Graduate Management Education 




Reservations (n = 3,415) 
The interviews I may have to have may be a barrier for me 4% 
The essays I have to write bay be a barrier for me 5% 
The recommendations I need to get may be a barrier for me* 5% 
My scores on admission tests may be a barrier for me* 12% 
My employment history may be a barrier for me 6% 
My undergraduate academic record may be a barrier for me* 9% 
It is too intimidating 3% 
It may require me to delay accepting attractive job opportunities 6% 
I may not receive the same benefits others will 5% 
It may require me to take on large financial debts* 29% 
The economy/job prospects are too uncertain 5% 
It may require more money that I have available* 33% 
It would severely limit the time I have for people who are 
important to me* 8% 
It may require me to postpone marriage, having a child, or other 
personal plans 10% 
The demands of graduate business school on my time/energy 
may be too great 8% 
*p<0.05; Items in bold significantly affect the overall X2 statistics of the contingency 
table. 
Source: Global MBA Graduate Survey, 2006 
 
In another survey, respondents were asked to rate the 
overall value of their MBA degree by comparing the total 
cost of the degree to the career opportunities received 
because of the degree.  Sixty-three percent of the 
graduates stated that the value of their MBA degree was 
outstanding or excellent relative to cost. (MBA.com, 2005a) 





Figure 25.   Overall Value of the MBA Degree 
Response 
2005 Percentage
 (n = 2,828) 
2006 Percentage 
(n = 6,139) 
Outstanding 24% 22% 
Excellent 34% 41% 
Good 27% 29% 
Fair 10% 7% 
Poor 5% 1% 
Total 100% 100% 
Source: MBA.com Registrants Survey, 2005 
 
The same survey also asked students to rate the 
various aspects of their degree that they felt added the 
most value. The top three aspects that received a rating of 
outstanding or excellent were faculty (68%), fellow 
students (64%), and the curriculum (57%). (Global MBA 
graduate survey2006) 
When asked to describe the school’s culture, most 
students used the following attributes to do so: 
collaborative; heterogeneous student body; active learning; 
academic curriculum; personal; small class sizes; teaching-
oriented; team emphasis; egalitarian; emphasizes critical 
discussion; casual; and close-knit community. (MBA.com, 
2005a)  
Figure 26 shows how students rated their satisfaction 
of their MBA for each of several different benefits. 
Graduating students were also asked to rate their level of 
improvement for various skills and abilities. (MBA.com, 
2005a) See Figure 27 for results. 
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Figure 26.   Satisfaction with the MBA Degree 
(n = 6,139) 















A sense of personal 
satisfaction 50% 37% 10% 2% 1% 100% 
Credentials I need to 
increase career options 38% 46% 14% 2% 0% 100% 
An opportunity for more 
challenging/interesting 
work in the future 
38% 45% 15% 2% 1% 100% 
An increase in long-term 
potential through the 
development of skills/ 
abilities 
37% 48% 13% 2% 1% 100% 
The ability to remain 
marketable (competitive) 37% 47% 13% 2% 0% 100% 
Advancement potential 36% 47% 15% 2% 0% 100% 
The potential for long 
term income and 
financial stability 
33% 45% 19% 3% 0% 100% 
Confidence I need to 
succeed 32% 45% 19% 3% 1% 100% 
Respect and recognition 27% 46% 23% 3% 1% 100% 
The ability to change 
occupational area 27% 41% 26% 5% 1% 100% 
The ability to switch 
industries 25% 37% 29% 7% 2% 100% 
The ability to expand by 
international employment 
opportunities 
21% 32% 34% 11% 3% 100% 
The right connections to 
get a good job in the 
future 
21% 31% 32% 13% 4% 100% 
Source: Global MBA Graduate Survey, 2006 
 
Graduating students were also asked to indicate the 
organizational level in which they previously worked and 
what level they plan on entering upon degree completion.  
Figure 28 shows the results. (MBA.com, 2005a)  
Graduating MBA students were moreover asked about 
their years of work experience prior to beginning their MBA 
degree.  About two-fifths had worked 6 years or more, 37 
percent worked between 3 and 6 years, 16 percent worked 
less than 3 years, and only 6 percent entered the full-time 
MBA program without any job experience. (MBA.com, 2005a)  
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Figure 27.   Level of Improvement in Skills and Abilities 












Ability to think 
strategically 42% 41% 11% 3% 1% 1% 100%
Ability to think 
globally 33% 39% 18% 6% 2% 2% 100%
Ability to integrate 
information from a wife 
variety of sources 
29% 45% 17% 4% 1% 3% 100%
Ability to think 
analytically 29% 43% 16% 4% 1% 6% 100%
Leadership Skills 29% 41% 20% 6% 2% 3% 100%
Ability to adapt/change 
to new situations 27% 44% 18% 55 2% 4% 100%
Oral Communication 
skills 27% 40% 20% 6% 2% 5% 100%
Ability to make 
decisions with 
imperfect information 
26% 46% 20% 5% 1% 2% 100%
Creative problem-
solving skills 24% 44% 20% 6% 2% 3% 100%
Quantitative Skills 24% 40% 22% 6% 2% 5% 100%
Cultural sensitivity 
and awareness 24% 34% 23% 9% 4% 7% 100%
Interpersonal Skills 23% 40% 22% 7% 2% 6% 100%
Project management/ 
implementation skills 22% 39% 25% 8% 3% 4% 100%
Skills in corporate 
ethical conduct 21% 37% 24% 10% 4% 5% 100%
Initiative/risk-taking 
ability 20% 43% 24% 7% 3% 3% 100%
Written communication 
skills 19% 37% 24% 9% 3% 9% 100%
Recruiting, managing, 
maintaining staff 16% 33% 30% 13% 6% 2% 100%
Technology skills for 
your specialty 15% 28% 28% 13% 8% 8% 100%
Source: Global MBA Graduate Survey, 2006 
 
Figure 28.   Job Level 
Job Level Pre-MBA Post-MBA 
Entry Level 24% 9% 
Mid-Level 56% 49% 
Senior Level 13% 28% 
Executive Level 4% 9% 
Business Owner/self-employed 3% 5% 
Other 1% 1% 
Total 100% 100% 
Source: MBA.com Registrants Survey, 2005 
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Sometimes getting an MBA can serve as a catalyst to 
starting a new career or switching career fields.  Figure 
29 presents a classification of recent MBA graduates as 
either “career enhancers” or “career switchers” based on 
their responses to a survey regarding motivations. 
(MBA.com, 2005a) 
 
Figure 29.   Career Switching vs. Career Enhancement 
Response (n = 4,757)
Career enhancers 51% 
Career switchers 49% 
Total 100% 
Source: MBA.com Registrants Survey, 2005 
 
Figure 30 shows what job functions recent graduates 
plan to assume upon completing their degree.(MBA.com, 
2005a) 
 
Figure 30.   Job Functions 




General management 12% 
Operations/logistics 8% 
Information technology/MIS 6% 
Human Resources 3% 
Total 100% 
Source: MBA.com Registrants Survey, 2005 
 
According to the Global MBA Survey of the classes of 
2000 and 2001, finance and marketing were the most popular 
concentration areas.  Strategy was tied with general 
management for third place.(Edgington & Olkin, 2002)  
Figure 31 shows the results of the survey. 
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Figure 31.   Industry Group Pursued for Employment 















18.7% 25.5% 6.8% 36.5% 
Products & 
Services 
21.3% 22.5% 1.2% 5.4% 
Consulting 14.5% 17.9% 3.3% 23.0% 




5.7% 4.5% -1.2% -
20.7% 
Manufacturing 7.2% 7.6% .3% 4.7% 
Nonprofit/ 
Government 
8.8% 4.5% -4.3% -
48.6% 
Energy/Utility 2.9% 3.0% .2% 6.6% 
Other 3.4% 3.3% -0.1% -2.6% 
Total 100% 100% -- -- 
*The percentage point and percent change may differ slightly from 
those calculable with the pre- and post-MBA percentages displayed 
because of rounding. 
Source: Global MBA Graduate Survey, 2006 
 
According to another survey, MBA graduates indicated 
that they work an average of fifty-one hours per 
week.(MBA.com, 2005a)  
B. EMPLOYERS 
Employers can choose to sponsor (through tuition 
assistance) an employee’s further education or they can 
simply recruit MBA graduates as new hires.  Either way, an 
MBA has to be important to corporations for students to 
spend the time, money and effort necessary to attain an 
MBA.  Corporations essentially make the market for MBAs.  
As the corporate world demands more MBAs, they become more 
valuable.  As demand decreases, so does their value.   
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The employer’s incentive for hiring MBAs is that they 
hope the MBAs will add value to their company.  Added value 
comes from not only the skill set provided by an MBA grad 
but the intangible skills, such as fresh perspective and 
critical thinking skills. 
1. Who Hires MBAs? 
Among the top 30 schools, MBA graduates in 2006 
received on average slightly more than two offers apiece 
from potential employers, up 20% over the previous year.  
In May of 2002, half of the nation’s MBA grads were still 
looking for work.  In May of 2006, only 14% were. (Lavelle 
& Lehman, 2006) 
From a survey of nearly 150 schools in 2006, Figure 32 
depicts the average number of job offers received among MBA 
graduates who had received at least one job offer. (GMAC, 
2006b) 
 




Not Yet Accepted 
Response (n = 1,490) (n = 522) 
One job offer 41% 33% 
Two job offers 26% 34% 
Three job offers 19% 20% 
Four or more job offers 15% 13% 
Total 100% 100% 
Items in bold in the contingency table significantly affect the overall X2 statistic 
Source: Global MBA Graduate Survey, 2006 
 
The traditional MBA employers have been firms in 
financial services, management consulting and consumer 
goods. They remain the biggest employers of MBAs to this 
date. The trend in recent years, however, has been for 
smaller firms in a variety of different industries, 
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including high-tech start-ups and nonprofits, to hire them, 
and for graduates to start their own businesses. Government 
employers have joined the fray, too, often preferring MBAs 
to those with master's degrees in fields such as public 
administration, public health and international relations. 
The mix of employers varies from year to year, depending 
largely upon the health of their own industries.(Montauk, 
2002)   Employers are growing more diverse.  According to 
Alysa Polkes, director of the Anderson School of Business’s 
(UCLA) MBA Career Management Center, some promising 
industries that are up-and-coming for MBAs “include 
defense, government positions, and mid-cap firms that make 
durable goods.” (Conley, 2002) 
It is important to note that discussions of the 
employers of MBAs generally focus only on a graduate’s 
first employer or those recruiters who are interested in 
hiring “freshly minted” MBAs. Almost no mention is 
generally made of the value of an MBA to employers 10 to 20 
years down the road, when a graduate uses the MBA as a top-
level manager.  These future mid-career and late-career 
employers are also important stakeholders for business 
schools and are, in effect, consumers of graduate 
management education or buyers of MBA graduates. These two 
different stakeholder groups, initial vs. future employers, 
however, clearly have different incentives. Initial 
employers seek value in the short term while future 
employers (and consequently MBA students themselves) expect 
MBA programs to provide education that is valuable over the 
long-term. Business schools consequently must make trade 
offs between the interests of these two groups and 
delicately balance training vs. education. 
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2. Why Do Employers Hire MBAs? 
In the broadest sense, the MBA degree represents a way 
of thinking, not just a set of financial skills and 
business knowledge.  When asked why Williams-Sonoma hires 
MBAs, HR manager Leslie Zurburg says, “We are looking for 
the 50,000 ft view – the strategic thinker who takes an 
analytical approach.   Operations managers who have risen 
through the company’s ranks are experts at getting things 
done, Zurburg says. But MBAs from the outside can bring a 
fresh prospective. Critical thinking is not a course, per 
se.  But this ability is woven into the MBA curriculum, 
which relies heavily on the case-study approach. 
John Pantano, cofounder of Radianse, a startup that 
develops indoor global positioning products, hires MBAs 
because they have “professional training in problem 
solving.  They know how to frame problems, ask questions 
and collect data.” 
In a 2006 survey conduct by the Graduate Management 
Admissions Council (GMAC), MBA recruiters were asked to 
indicate the skills and abilities they find attractive in 
MBA graduates. Figure 33 provides the results of this 
survey. The responses indicated that ability to think 
analytically and strategically are valued most by potential 
employers of MBAs.  Those skills coming in close behind 
include quantitative skills, leadership skills, oral 
communication skills, creative problem-solving skills, the 
ability to integrate information, and project 
management/implementation skills. (GMAC, 2006b) 
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Figure 33.   Corporate Recruiters Survey 2006  
Source: Corporate Recruiters Survey, 2006 
 
3. From Which Schools Do Employers Hires MBAs? 
When 940 recruiters were asked how they viewed the 
reputation of a school in a Corporate Recruiter Survey in 
2002-03, seventy-five percent of the respondents listed 
experiential factors (i.e., the success of alumni they’ve 
previously hired and their own experiences dealing with the 
university).  Over 50 percent listed the quality of the 
curriculum, and thirty-three percent listed the quality of 
the faculty. (Olkin, 2004)   
Skills/Abilities Recruiters Find Attractive in MBA Graduates 
Skills/Abilities n = 1,173 
Ability to think analytically 78% 
Ability to think strategically 71% 
Quantitative skills 58% 
Leadership skills 56% 
Oral communication skills 53% 
Creative problem-solving skills 52% 
Ability to integrate information 51% 
Project management/implementation skills 51% 
Interpersonal skills 48% 
Written communication skills 48% 
Ability to adapt/change to new Situations 45% 
Work ethic 38% 
Ability to make decisions with imperfect information 35% 
Initiative/risk-taking ability 33% 
Technological skills 28% 
People management skills 27% 
Cultural sensitivity and awareness 22% 
Skills in corporate ethical conduct 20% 
Other 3% 
None of the above 3% 
Responses may add to more than 100% due to multiple selections 
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Karen Keasler, manager of IBM’s Marketing Leadership 
Development Program indicates that she uses Business Week 
and U.S. News and World Report rankings as kind of a filter 
to help decide where her recruiting efforts and resources 
can be best focused.  “I’ll generally cut it off at the top 
30 schools from those lists,” she says.  “That doesn’t mean 
I wouldn’t consider a great candidate from a school that 
wasn’t on those lists, but I have to spend my recruitment 
dollars carefully.” (Wuorio, 2001) 
“Getting an MBA is a big accomplishment.” says 
Michelle Rapp, associate director of graduate student 
career services at Boston based Suffolk University. “But 
once you have it, you still have to compete for jobs. MBA 
students say, ‘I want to interview at [a top ten consulting 
firm],’and I tell them, ‘That company recruits only from 
top 10 schools.’ You have to be realistic.” 
Top schools are brand names, agrees another recruiter. 
When you are competing against a brand name, “the burden of 
proof is on you,” he says, even though core MBA courses 
remain remarkably similar across different institutions. 
Degree creep (meaning more and more people are getting 
MBA’s to stay competitive) has devalued the degree.  “The 
quality of the MBA program has become 
determinative.”(Montauk, 2002) 
Nonetheless, businesses are sending recruiters to more 
schools in search of MBAs from a broader range of outlets.  
Figure 34 shows that in a 2005 survey, 37 percent of the 
recruiters surveyed visited 7 or more schools to recruit 
MBAs.  The data shows that the average number of schools 
that recruiters visit is 8. 
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Figure 34.   Number of Schools Which   Company Visits to 
Recruit MBAs (GMAC, 2006a) 
Actual 2005 
Number of Schools 
(n = 816) 
None 17% 
3 or less 23% 
4, but less than 7 23% 
7 or more 37% 
Total 100% 
Mean 8 
Source: Corporate Recruiters Survey, 2006 
 
4. Why Do Some Employers Sponsor MBA Education? 
In one study of 2,570 employees, 55 percent indicated 
that their company provided education support and even 
reimbursement for career development.(GMAC, 2006c)  In 
fact, about one in ten (11%) of new MBA graduates state 
they are postponing their job search to fulfill contractual 
obligations with their current employer.(GMAC, 2006b) 
Figure 35 demonstrates that the preference for 
corporations when reimbursing for or sponsoring MBA degrees 
is for part-time MBA programs.  While many employers are 
willing to pay for graduate degrees for their employees, 





Figure 35.   Corporate Reimbursement and Sponsorship 









sponsored/reimbursed 59% 66% 62% 
Average Cost per 
employee per year $27,750 $21,327 $27,098 
Source: Corporate Recruiters Survey, 2006 
 
So what motivates employers to pay for graduate 
management education? “Research shows that companies that 
invest in education for their employees have a much higher 
retention rate than companies that don’t,” notes Mark 
Allen, director of executive education at the Graziadio 
School of Business and Management at Pepperdine University. 
“It’s almost counter intuitive.  People who don’t invest in 
education say, ‘What if I pay to educate employees and they 
leave?’   I answer, ‘You’re asking the wrong question. What 
if you don’t educate them, and they stay?’” (Shinn, 2004b) 
Even if an employer doesn’t directly fund an 
employee’s MBA education, the organization will often seek 
to re-hire its former employees after completion of the 
degree. Figure 36 shows that 26% of MBA graduates received 
job offers from a current or previous employer. 
 
Figure 36.   Sources of Job Offers 
Source (n = 2,001)
An on-campus recruiter 48% 
An organization where you had an internship or 
work project 
43% 
An organization contacted in an off-campus job 
search 
34% 
Current or previous employing organization 26% 
An alumnus from your school 11% 
Other 7% 




What is the true value of an MBA?  The true value lies 
in the eye of the beholder.  In the MBA industry, the 
beholders are the buyers who are the students and the 
employers who will hire the students. 
With respect to the power of student as buyers, both 
the MBA programs and the students posses some leverage.  
While the students decide where to apply, the MBA programs 
ultimately can deny a student acceptance.  However, the MBA 
programs have to attract students.  The MBA is a product 
that people can live without.  It is almost a luxury item.  
Only those willing and able to afford and complete the MBA 
program can purchase this item.  So, even though the MBA 
programs can deny access to students they do not feel are 
worthy to participate in their programs, if students do not 
apply, they sell no product.  It is for this reason that 
students and MBA programs share leverage.  The MBA programs 
need the students as much as the students need the MBA 
programs. 
That being said, there is obviously significant demand 
for the MBA degree from students.  The reason they demand 
the degree is because they believe that it will enable them 
to receive greater opportunities in their career, receive a 
higher salary, or launch them into a new career.  With the 
plethora of MBA programs to choose from, how do they 
decide?  In many cases, students choose the highest ranked 
program to which they are accepted, although this may not 
always be the best financial decision.   
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Students choose the highest ranked schools because, in 
their mind, the top-ranked schools give them the highest 
potential to fulfill their purposes for pursing the MBA in 
the first place.  However, choosing to get a full-time MBA 
from the top-ranked schools does not necessarily offer the 
best ROI. 
Given that a student has to give up a current salary 
and job position to pursue a full-time MBA in hopes of a 
future increase in salary, the opportunity costs during the 
“mean time” are usually high.  In fact, after looking at 
the data provided in the chapter, a conclusion could be 
drawn that pursing an MBA degree at all is not worth what 
you have to give up.   
Luckily, for those who cannot afford to quit their job 
for two years or who cannot afford to pay for the full-
time, two-year MBA program, there are alternatives that can 
limit the opportunity costs incurred while still offering 
an MBA.  However, evidence shows that students choosing the 
part-time degree or executive degree are not as satisfied 
with their degrees as those who incurred the costs to earn 
the two-year, full-time degree.  Also, those who choose to 
pursue part-time or distance learning degree miss out on 
the important classroom environment and/or on-campus 
networking that the resident degree provides. 
From a purely financial value perspective, it is not 
clear that students benefit most from choosing a top-ranked 
school or even pursuing an MBA degree at all. Surveys 
suggest, however, that the MBA conveys significant 
intangible non-financial value. In particular, students 
perceive a greater value in a degree earned from a top-
ranked school than they do from a lower- or non-ranked 
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school.  This perception fuels the competition for rankings 
that was mentioned in the previous chapter.  
2. Employers 
Employer preferences have a significant affect on 
market for MBAs.  The employer’s demand for MBAs dictates 
the job availability and salary range.  Historical evidence 
suggests that the demand for MBAs is cyclical.  In cycles 
of high demand salaries for MBAs are proportionally higher.  
The inverse is true in cycles of low demand.   Regardless 
of the point in the cycle, employers are always seeking the 
best value to raise their company’s performance by 
enhancing employees’ abilities. 
Best value is defined as the greatest benefit relative 
to cost. What employers define as “benefit,” however, can 
range from training which allows employees to perform 
routine tasks more efficiently to higher-level education 
which emphasizes critical thinking and complex problem 
solving skills. 
The lower end and least expensive end of the spectrum 
is focused on training. Costs for providing training for 
employees can be low and still provide positive return on 
investment. Certifying employees in relevant disciplines 
assures that the work force has the necessary tools to 
realize efficiencies. Examples of this end would be Lean 
Six Sigma Green Belt Training or Defense Acquisition 
University Certifications. 
There are options in the middle range of the spectrum 
that can partially address both training and educational 
requirements. Primarily this intermediate range focuses on 
education and training delivery methods such as online 
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courses, seminars, corporate universities or enrolling 
employees as part time students in non-resident MBA 
programs. 
The high end of the spectrum is the most expensive 
option and focuses on education that will give employees 
the critical thinking and problem solving skills needed to 
take the company’s performance to a new level of 
profitability.  Employers who invest at this level make use 
of recruiters to hire MBA graduates from top schools.    
Employers are not short on options to find the best 
value for their company’s requirements. Potential students 
and current employees watch the hiring and advancement 
trends of their industry. In other words, they take their 
guidance from what employers are seeking. It is imperative 
for business schools to understand the dynamics of 
employer’s expectations and to position themselves where 
their services are consistent with the needs of this 
important customer. The customer in this case, however, is 
not only the first organization to employ the MBA graduate, 
but also every future employer who will expect the graduate 
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V. FACULTY 
A. CATEGORIES OF BUSINESS SCHOOL FACULTY 
The most important suppliers to the graduate 
management education industry are the business school 
faculty who fill the teaching, research, and administrative 
roles with any MBA program. To understand the incentives, 
leverage, and importance of these key suppliers, one must 
first understand the different categories of business 
school faculty. 
Generally speaking, faculty can be classified based on 
the nature of their employment relationship with their 
college or university.  A typical faculty member’s 
employment may be either full-time or part-time and, if 
full-time, either tenure-track or non-tenure-track.  
Finally, full-time tenure-track faculty member can be 
either tenured or untenured.  While faculty categories and 
job titles can vary significantly across institutions, 
Figure 37 provides a general picture of the breakdown of 
faculty categories at a typical university. 
 
Figure 37.   Classification of Higher Education Faculty 














Full-time tenure-track (FTTT) faculty members 
typically follow the path of the “prototypical American 
scholar” (Boyer 1990) or “complete scholar” (Rice 1996) 
engaged in research, teaching and service. (Gappa et al., 
2007)  As the name implies, tenure-track faculty positions 
offer the potential for professional “tenure,” which 
provides a guarantee of job security in that a tenured 
faculty member is granted the contractual right not to be 
fired without cause.  A tenure-track faculty member has 
generally earned a doctorate or other terminal degree in 
his or her chosen field and usually carries the title of 
professor, associate professor, or assistant professor. 
Full-time non-tenure track (FTNTT) faculty, in 
contrast, do not have the opportunity to receive 
professional tenure and are generally employed under 
contract-renewable appointments.  Typical non-tenure track 
faculty positions carry titles such as lecturer or 
instructor and generally involve specialization, usually in 
teaching but sometimes in research.(Gappa et al., 2007) 
FTNTT faculty appointments represent a more flexible 
alternative to tenured appointments and are useful in 
hiring professionals with special expertise who would not 
necessarily seek or be qualified for tenure-track 
positions. Business schools, for example, hire senior 
“professors of practice,” that is, people with extensive 
practical experience in their professions to augment 
tenure-track faculty in such curricular areas as 
accounting, where knowledge of practice is critical. (Gappa 
et al., 2007) 
Part-time faculty (sometimes called “adjunct faculty”) 
are hired temporarily to teach specific courses and are 
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often paid on a per-course, per-segment, or even per-
student basis.  Business education, in particular, relies 
heavily on part-time faculty due to the ready availability 
and value of practitioners who can bring current knowledge 
of their profession to the classroom. In fact, across all 
colleges and universities (including 2-year associate 
degree institutions), fully 51% of business faculty are 
employed on a part-time basis. Only 27 percent of part-
timers, however, hold a doctorate or equivalent degree, 
although 54 percent have one or more master’s degrees.  
 
Figure 38.   Faculty Employment Status by Institutional 
Category, Fall 2005  























25.6% 13.3% 38.9% 12.5% 48.6% 61.1% 
Baccalaurea









26.1% 11.3% 37.4% 15.6% 47.0% 62.6% 
Source: John W. Curtis & Monica F. Jacobe, “Consequences: 
An Increasingly Contingent Faculty,” American Association 
of University Professors, 2006 
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Taken together, part-time and non-tenure track faculty 
are identified as “contingent faculty” by the American 
Association of University Professors (AAUP). With this 
classification in mind, Figure 38 provides a breakdown of 
higher education faculty in the United States by employment 
status and institutional category. 
B. BALANCING TENURE-TRACK VS. “CONTINGENT” FACULTY 
During the last three decades, there has been a 
significant growth in the share of faculty members in 
American colleges and universities that are employed in 
part-time or full-time non tenure-track positions.  This 
trend away from tenure-track appointments in favor of more 
contingent appointments is illustrated in Figure 39.  
 
Figure 39.   Trends in Faculty Employment Status, All 
Colleges & Universities, 1975-2005  
Tenure-Track Faculty "Contingent" Faculty 
 





1975 36.5% 20.3% 56.8% 13.0% 30.2% 43.2% 
1989 33.1% 13.7% 46.8% 16.9% 36.4% 53.3% 
1995 30.6% 11.8% 42.4% 16.7% 40.9% 57.6% 
2005 26.1% 11.3% 37.4% 15.6% 47.0% 62.6% 
Source: John W. Curtis & Monica F. Jacobe, “Consequences: 
An Increasingly Contingent Faculty,” American Association 
of University Professors, 2006 
 
While the data used in Figure 39 includes all 
educational fields, the increasing use of contingent 
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faculty is also clearly evident in the field of business 
and management. The AACSB reports that the number of 
faculty in non-tenure-track positions at business schools 
has risen slowly but steadily in recent years, further 
noting that, “It seems clear that more schools are using 
adjunct or visiting professors to fill in open teaching 
slots, or they might be hiring faculty on a more temporary 
basis while they consider how to restructure staffs to 
create long-term solutions.” (LeClair, 2004) 
In fact, nearly one-quarter of all new hires at 
business schools in 2005 were in the instructor or lecturer 
rank. (AACSB, 2006a) 
This widespread substitution of contingent faculty for 
tenure-track faculty is at least partially due to the 
growing financial pressures faced by higher education 
institutions, coupled with the lower cost and greater 
flexibility associated with contingent employment. 
(Ehrenberg & Zhang Liang, 2004) This trend has potential 
negative consequences, however, in terms of both teaching 
and research. 
With respect to teaching, Ehrenberg and Liang (2004) 
found that increases in the percentage of either part-time 
faculty or non-tenure track faculty were each associated 
with a reduction in graduation rates. (Ehrenberg & Zhang 
Liang, 2004)  In particular, they found that, other factors 
held constant, a 10 percentage point increase in the 
percentage of part-time faculty at a public academic 
institution was associated with a 2.65 percentage point 
reduction in the institution’s graduation rate.  Similarly, 
a 10-percentage point increase in the percentage of full-
time non-tenure-track faculty at a public college or 
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university was associated with a 2.32 percentage point 
reduction in the institution’s graduation rate.  
Particularly relevant for graduate management education, 
the magnitude of both of these effects was found to be 
greatest at a master’s level institutions. (Ehrenberg & 
Zhang Liang, 2004)  The American Association of University 
Professors has similarly warned about the negative impact 
on educational quality that is inherent in the trend toward 
greater reliance on contingent faculty. 
The negative research implications of this trend, on 
the other hand, are a consequence of the limited time 
generally available to contingent faculty for conducting 
research as well as the sometimes less significant 
preparation for academic research relative to their tenure-
track colleagues.  First of all, faculty in contingent 
positions often carry heavy teaching loads with little time 
for academic research.(Gappa et al., 2007)   Secondly, the 
percentage of faculty with doctorate degrees focused on 
research is significantly lower among contingent faculty 
than tenure-track-faculty.  In addition, while AACSB 
accreditation standards allow for the use of non-doctoral 
“professionally qualified” faculty where suited to the 
schools mission, the requirements nonetheless specify 
ratios of doctorally qualified faculty relative to full 
staff. (AACSB, 2003) 
C. FACULTY CAREER PROGRESSION 
The career “ladder” and progression processes vary 
significantly between tenure-track and non-tenure-track 
faculty positions.  Whereas the tenure-track career path is 
characterized by an “up or out” progression with the 
potential reward of tenure, the non-tenure-track career 
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path is one in which promotion is not a requirement for 
retention but even the most senior faculty members may lack 
true job security. 
First, consider Figure 40, which provides a 
generalization of the typical tenure-track faculty career 
path. 
 




















Virtually all tenure track appointments first require 
completion of a doctorate degree (Gappa et al., 2007) , 
which generally involves achievement of four primary 
milestones: 
• approximately two years of coursework, which 
provides the foundation of research knowledge; 
• a comprehensive exam or set of exams; 
• an acceptable dissertation research proposal and 
consequent written dissertation; and 
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• a successful oral “defense” of the dissertation 
to the faculty of the degree-granting 
institution(Briley, 1997)  
 
Combined, the entire process of earning a doctorate 
degree in a business or management field requires an 
average of 7.7 years of “registered time” after receiving 
the baccalaureate degree, according to a 2004 Survey of 
Earned Doctorates conducted by the National Opinion 
Research Center. (AACSB, 2006b)  The same survey concluded 
that the average age at the time of achieving a doctorate 
in business or management was 35.7 years old. (AACSB, 
2006b) 
Initial tenure-track appointments are generally at the 
rank of assistant professor, a position which can be held 
for only a limited amount of time before the faculty member 
is considered for promotion to associate professor, a 
promotion which usually (but not always) comes with the 
granting of tenure.  The limited number of years during 
which a junior faculty member is allowed to “qualify” 
himself or herself for promotion to a tenured position is 
commonly referred to as the “tenure clock” and, while 
highly variable across schools, is commonly around six 
years in the business and management fields.  The tenure-
track career path is considered an “up or out” system in 
that, if denied tenure, a faculty member must subsequently 
leave the school, although he or she is often granted a 
one-year “grace period” in which to find another position.  
Tenured associate professors subsequently face the 
opportunity for promotion to “full” professor, although 
this promotion is frequently not an “up or out” decision. 
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While the above description is an attempt to describe 
the typical tenure-track career progression, it is 
important to note that the standards, process, and 
timelines vary significantly across schools and across 
disciplines.  For example, while both associate professor 
and full professor are commonly tenured positions, a 2006 
survey by the AAUP found that 6.1% of faculty with the 
title of professor were, in fact, untenured (4.9% being 
non-tenure-track positions) and 19.7% of faculty with title 
of associate professor were untenured (8.1% being non-
tenure-track positions).(Thornton, 2006)   At some business 
schools, in fact, associate professor is an untenured 
position and tenure is only granted at time of promotion to 
full professor, making this second promotion hurdle an 
additional “up or out” decision. 
The non-tenure-track career ladder, on the other hand, 
could perhaps be described as providing potentially greater 
job security (relative to the tenure-track ladder) at the 
junior levels but less job security at the senior levels. A 
generalization of the non-tenure track career ladder is 
provided in Figure 41. 
While it is not uncommon for lecturers or instructors 
to possess doctorate degrees, especially at higher-level 
research universities, it is often not a requirement for 
appointment to these non-tenure-track positions.  
Frequently, candidates with a master’s degree combined with 
significant practitioner experience are employed as 
lecturers, especially in “professional” fields such as 
business. 
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Non-tenure-track faculty do enjoy the job security 
associated with not confronting a “tenure clock” or “up or 
out” promotion process. NTTF appointment contracts can 
conceivably be renewed indefinitely, even without promotion 
to a higher position such as senior lecturer.  On the other 
hand, non-tenure-track faculty do not have the opportunity 
to achieve the ultimate job security of tenure.  Even the 
most experienced senior lecturers face the possibility of 
losing their job if, for example, the school decides to 
reduce staff to save money, a danger not faced by tenured 
faculty (who can only be fired for cause). 
With these generalizations of faculty career ladders 
in mind, it is instructive to observe Figure 42, which 
provides an illustration of the general distribution of 
faculty at all U.S. higher education institutions among 
different ranks.  Unfortunately, however, research by the 
AAUP (which generated the data in the table) does not break 
down the instructor/lecturer category by junior vs. senior 
ranks. 
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Figure 42.   Distribution of Faculty by Rank and 
Institutional Category, 2005-2006 








Universities 37.4% 26.0% 24.3% 11.0% 1.2% 
Master's Degree 
Universities 29.0% 27.0% 29.7% 12.9% 1.4% 
Baccalaureate 
Colleges 29.5% 28.6% 32.3% 8.7% 0.9% 
Associate Degree 
Colleges 27.3% 25.2% 27.7% 19.1% 0.7% 
All Colleges & 
Universities 33.1% 26.6% 27.2% 11.8% 1.2% 
Source: American Association of University Professors, 
“The Annual Report on the Economic Status of the 
Profession: 2005-06,” March-April 2006. 
 
D. FACULTY ROLES: TEACHING VS. RESEARCH  
While business school faculty members fill numerous 
administrative and other roles, the primary 
responsibilities of the professors and lecturers at any 
institution generally reside in the two areas of teaching 
and research. While contingent faculty are often given 
incentives that require or encourage productivity in a 
particular dimension (usually teaching but sometimes 
research), tenure-track faculty are, at least on the face 
of things, encouraged to devote their efforts to both 
teaching and research. 
Figure 43 illustrates where faculty members of all 
categories and all disciplines place themselves in the 
relative balance between teaching and research.  It is of 
interest to note from the table that the largest group of 
faculty at both public and private universities was those 
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who consider their primary interest to be in both teaching 
and research, “but leaning toward research.” 
 
Figure 43.    Balance of Faculty Interest between 
Teaching and Research 








Very heavily in teaching 16.4% 15.6% 
In teaching and research, but leaning
toward teaching 
34.5% 32.8% 
In teaching and research, but leaning 
toward research 
40.5% 44.4% 
Very heavily in research 8.6% 7.2% 
Source: Chronicle of Higher Education, Volume 50, Issue 1, 
Page A20 
 
Students, who are the direct consumers of higher 
education, are often surprised to learn that faculty 
members consider their primary responsibility to be in the 
area of research rather than teaching.  The greatest 
paradox of academic work is that most professors teach most 
of the time and large proportions of them teach all the 
time, but teaching is not the activity most rewarded by the 
academic profession or valued by the system at large. 
Trustees and administrators in one sector after another 
praise teaching, but reward research. (Gappa et al., 2007) 
First of all, the hiring criteria used by business 
schools to judge new business doctorates looking for their 
first job have historically been based primarily on 
perceived research potential.  Teaching potential has been 
a distant second.   
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Second, the standards for promotion in general and 
tenure in particular, which in large part determine faculty 
activities, have traditionally defined faculty productivity 
in terms of research and publication. Service and teaching 
are risky priorities for faculty members seeking promotion 
or tenure at many institutions.  As one young faculty 
member lamented, “As a new junior professor, I have come 
into the profession with a strong interest in research but 
an equally strong interest in serving students by helping 
them learn both inside and outside of the classroom. The 
attitude I’m receiving from all levels…. Is that research 
is what counts. If the other areas of service and teaching 
are lacking but research is strong, then promotions will 
follow.”(Diamond & Bronwyn E. Adam, 1993)  
Third, greater research productivity simply correlates 
to higher faculty compensation. Evidence that research and 
publication significantly affect a faculty members’ 
compensation level appears in a number of studies 
(Fairweather 1993; Fairweather, 1995; Hunnicutt, Taylor, 
and Keeffe, 1991; Kasten, 1984; Marchant and Newman, 1994, 
Prewit, Phillips, and Yasin, 1991).(Sutton & Bergerson, )  
Empirical studies of factors that affect individual faculty 
compensation typically have found that the best predictor 
of salary within an institution and within any rank are an 
individual’s years of experience (Lewis, 1996). The number 
of articles published, however, is the second best 
predictor (Tuckman and Tuckman, 1976). Publication of 
scholarly journal articles enables individual faculty 
members to be promoted more rapidly and once the top rank 
is reached, publication enables an individual’s 
compensation to continue to rise. Book publication, 
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however, is not as rewarding as article publication.(Sutton 
& Bergerson, )  Figure 44 shows the range of publications 
for full-time faculty members between 2001-2002. 
 
Figure 44.   Research Publications of Full-Time Faculty 
Members, 2001-2002 
Percentage of faculty with given number of 
professional writings published or accepted for 





None 19.6% 18.1% 
1 to 2 26.5% 26.5% 
3 to 4 27.3% 28.0% 
5 to 10 20.6% 22.1% 
11 to 20 4.7% 4.7% 
21 to 50 1.1% 0.5% 
More than 50 0.2% 0.1% 
Source: Chronicle of Higher Education, Volume 50, Issue 1, 
Page A20 
 
In addition, these empirical studies suggest that 
faculty rewards for teaching are minimal at best. Kasten 
(1984) reports that “Research on the relationship between 
teaching and rewards has been inconclusive,” and cites 
eleven studies since 1970 that reached different 
conclusions about teaching and faculty rewards. (Sutton & 
Bergerson, ) 
Finally, regardless of financial and career 
incentives, it should come as no surprise that tenure-track 
faculty members would be inclined towards research rather 
than teaching, given the fact that the most significant 
pre-requisite to becoming a tenure-track faculty member is 
completion of an appropriate doctorate degree. Most 
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doctoral programs provide intensive preparation for high-
level research and very little preparation for classroom 
teaching. This is especially true among the most highly 
ranked programs. (Briley, 1997) Anyone who would choose to 
spend 5 to 9 years of their life in a business doctoral 
program must possess a strong affinity for research to 
begin with and would moreover leave the program with skills 
primarily suited for this particular task. 
1. The Nature of Business School Research 
If research is indeed so important to a tenure-track 
faculty member’s career, it is important to inquire about 
what actually qualifies as research.  While the definition 
of “academic research” varies significantly across 
institutions and discipline, AACSB accreditation standards 
provide some guidance as to the nature of research in the 
field of business scholarship. 
 The final report of the AACSB Task Force on Faculty 
Research defined research in the following way: “Research 
must be written, be subject to scrutiny and criticism by 
one’s peers and extend the boundaries of current 
knowledge.” The report went on to note that written 
material (such as some consulting reports) that is 
proprietary would not meet the definition and thus would 
not qualify as research. (Diamond & Bronwyn E. Adam, 1993) 
The AACSB accreditation standard requiring 
“intellectual contributions” requires business school 
faculty members to “make intellectual contributions on a 
continuing basis appropriate to the mission of the school. 
The outputs of intellectual contributions should be 
available for public scrutiny by academic peers or 
practitioners.” The standard goes on to interpret the 
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components of such intellectual contributions to include 
the creation of new knowledge (basic scholarship); the 
application, transfer, and interpretation of knowledge to 
improve management practice and teaching (applied 
scholarship) and the enhancement of the educational value 
of instructional efforts of the institution or discipline 
(instructional developments). (Diamond & Bronwyn E. Adam, 
1993) 
While this AACSB standard asks faculty members to 
conduct research that is “appropriate to the mission of the 
school,” it is important to note that untenured faculty 
members must be wary of conducting research that is too 
closely tied to the interests of a particular school or 
select set of schools.  For example, while researching 
“instructional developments” such as case studies is highly 
valued at schools such as the Harvard Business School, the 
University of Virginia (Darden School of Business), and 
other select institutions which emphasize development of 
such teaching materials, such research is often devalued at 
most business schools which emphasize traditional journal 
publications in their hiring and promotion criteria.  For 
this reason, junior faculty who have no guarantee of 
continued employment must be concerned about research that 
constitutes a “relationship-specific investment” in a 
particular institution or set of institutions and, 
consequently, untenured faculty must be more concerned 
about conducting research that will make them marketable to 
a broad set of potential employers. 
E. BUSINESS FACULTY SHORTAGE: DEMAND EXCEEDS SUPPLY 
While the number of master’s degrees in business and 
management awarded in the U.S. has exploded in recent 
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decades, the number of doctoral degrees in business and 
management has stagnated and even declined.  The 
consequences of these two trends is that there is an 
increasing demand for qualified business faculty while at 
the same time there is a stagnating or decreasing supply of 
such faculty. 
In 2002, the AACSB issued an ominous report, 
“Management Education at Risk,” and in 2003, its Doctoral 
Faculty Commission issued its findings in “Sustaining 
Scholarship in Business Schools.”  Both of these reports 
issue warnings of the impending shortage of doctoral 
business faculty.(Fields, 2006)  
Whereas there are more Master’s Degrees granted each 
year in business than in any field other than education, 
the business and management field ranks only eighth in 
terms of the number of doctoral degrees conferred each 
year.(Chronicle, 2007) Figure 45 documents the number of 
master’s degrees and doctoral degrees awarded in the U.S., 
as well as the ratio between the two numbers, from 1969 to 
2004.  Most troubling is the recent period from 1994-5 to 
2001-2 when the number of doctoral degrees conferred 
declined by 17% while the number of master’s degrees 
increased by 28%.  The ratio of master’s degrees to 





Figure 45.   Degrees Conferred in Business and Management 






1969-70 21,561 620 34.8 
1970-71 25,977 757 34.3 
1971-72 30,028 859 35.0 
1972-73 30,638 902 34.0 
1973-74 32,172 919 35.0 
1974-75 35,758 936 38.2 
1975-76 42,054 900 46.7 
1976-77 46,006 827 55.6 
1977-78 47,837 823 58.1 
1978-79 49,855 821 60.7 
1979-80 54,484 753 72.4 
1980-81 57,391 795 72.2 
1981-82 60,763 815 74.6 
1982-83 64,758 776 83.5 
1983-84 66,150 929 71.2 
1984-85 66,996 831 80.6 
1985-86 66,689 934 71.4 
1986-87 67,093 1,062 63.2 
1987-88 69,230 1,063 65.1 
1988-89 73,065 1,100 66.4 
1989-90 76,676 1,093 70.2 
1990-91 78,255 1,185 66.0 
1991-92 84,642 1,242 68.1 
1992-93 89,615 1,346 66.6 
1993-94 93,437 1,364 68.5 
1994-95 93,809 1,394 67.3 
1995-96 93,982 1,368 68.7 
1996-97 97,619 1,336 73.1 
1997-98 102,171 1,290 79.2 
1998-99 108,085 1,202 89.9 
1999-00 112,258 1,196 93.9 
2000-01 116,475 1,180 98.7 
2001-02 120,277 1,155 104.1 
2002-03 129,178 1,257 102.8 
2003-04 139,344 1,481 94.1 
Source: AACSB 
 
The problem is not only that there are fewer business 
doctorates overall (at least relative to master’s degrees), 
but also that there a fewer business doctorates from the 
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top schools.  For example, the percentage of doctorates 
produced by the AACSB-accredited institutions decreased to 
84% in 1999-2000 from 92% a decade earlier. (AACSB, 2003)  
Moreover, most of the top-25 business Ph.D. producers have 
shrunk their programs.(Zimmerman, 2001)  “If you look at 
the list AACSB puts out on the top 10 producers and take 
out a couple of schools that don’t really provide people 
for the academic market,” noted University of Florida 
business dean, John Kraft, “you would see almost every 
major school has probably substantially reduced their Ph.D. 
program, and that’s not going to change.” (AACSB, 1998) 
The driving forces behind this trend are budget 
constraints and changing priorities. Business schools have 
to find the resources to compete and the Ph.D. program is 
the place to cut. There are fewer resources being put into 
doctorate programs at the top schools primarily because of 
the competition for rankings in Business Week, the Wall 
Street Journal and so on. “Much more effort is delivered to 
the MBAs and, of necessity, it has an effect on the 
training of Ph.D. students,” noted Ross Watts, chair of the 
Ph.D. program and professor of accounting and finance at 
the University of Rochester. “The faculty is just not as 
available as it used to be.  They are putting a lot more 
effort into their MBA teaching, which isn’t inappropriate, 
but the Ph.D. program becomes the stepsister.” (AACSB, 
1998) 
Surveys by the AACSB on present and future faculty 
demand clearly indicate that a shortage is present and 
growing. In 2005, 400 schools surveyed (out of an estimated 
1,500 U.S. schools offering business degrees) were 
recruiting for nearly 1,150 new doctorates at a time when 
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only slightly more than 1,000 business doctorates are 
produced each year.  These same 400 schools expected more 
than 3,100 new doctoral degree positions to open up in the 
next five years due to retirements and additions to 
existing staff.(Fairbank et al., 2005)  The AACSB also 
estimated that the supply of business Ph.D.s would trail 
demand by 1,142 in 2007 and 2,419 in 2012.  If more things 
go right than wrong, the AACSB noted that the shortage 
could be as few as 21 in 2007 and 334 in 2012.  But, in a 
worst-case scenario, the shortfall may reach as many as 
3,043 in 2007 and as many as 5,689 in 2012.(Fields, 2006)  
1. An Increasingly Foreign Candidate Pool 
The stagnation or decline in the development of new 
business doctorates is also accompanied by an increase in 
the number of foreign doctorates from U.S. schools.  To 
make up for the shortage in the doctoral programs, many 
U.S. business schools have turned to foreign applicants, 
mainly from China and the former Soviet Union states. 
(Zimmerman, 2001)  A study by the AACSB revealed that only 
52.9 percent of students enrolled in U.S. business doctoral 
programs were U.S. citizens or had permanent Visas.  The 
rest were non-U.S. citizens without permanent visas.(AACSB, 
2006b)  Michigan’s Caul said that of 150 finance 
applications he looked at this year, 60 percent were from 
China alone. Duke’s program had 120 applications this year 
and 156 were from foreign students, according to Jim 
Bettman, director of the Ph.D. program.  Two-thirds of 
UCLA’s applicants in the past three years have been from 
other countries. 
So while business Ph.D. candidates from non-English 
speaking foreign countries are clamoring for American 
103 
training in management, the concern is that these 
applicants may lack the English language skills necessary 
to walk into a classroom and immediately be an excellent 
teacher.(AACSB, 1998) These applicants may want to teach in 
American schools, but they are not easy to place on 
faculties because they lack fluency in English and ease 
with an MBA classroom style. (AACSB, 1998) Not 
surprisingly, the percentage of foreign-born faculty at 
U.S. business schools is increasing. Among the top 50 
schools in the most recent Financial Times ranking, almost 
31 percent of faculty, on average, were international.  If 
the top 50 schools were to be grouped into U.S. school and 
non-U.S. schools, international faculty members would 
represent, on average, 25 percent and 42 percent, 
respectively, of the faculties. (AACSB, 2002)  
2. Competing with the Private Sector 
It is also important to note that the actual supply of 
new faculty to graduate business education is significantly 
lower than the production of business doctorates, as many 
of these graduates choose careers outside of academia. 
Figure 46 shows the different career choices for newly 
minted business and management doctorates as of 2004. 
(AACSB, 2006b) 
“Increasingly, more and more new Ph.D. graduates are 
going into the private sector,” noted David Kidwell, dean 
at Minnesota's Carlson School of Business. “Those students 
provide a high level of theoretical and quantitative 
understanding of their disciplines and research, which is 
increasingly valuable to high end consulting firms. It’s 
not a huge trend, but it is one that is increasing.” 
(AACSB, 1998) 
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Figure 46.   Doctoral Career Choices of Business and 
Management Doctorates (2004) 
Postdoctoral Plans Percent 
Postdoctoral Study 4.1 
Employment After Doctorate 79.5 
  Educational Institution 63.4 
  Industry/Business 10.0 
  Government 2.4 
  Nonprofit 1.9 
  Other and unknown employment 1.7 
Unknown Postdoctoral plans 16.4 
Source: Survey of Earned Doctorates, 2004, National 
Opinion Research Center 
 
The private sector, especially investment houses, 
technology companies and accounting firms also are looking 
for talent; and, they come armed with bigger budgets than 
business schools.(AACSB, 1998) In fact, a Wall Street 
company will readily pay two to four times as much as a b-
school when they want what the Ph.D. has to offer.  (AACSB, 
1998) 
Schools trying to reverse this trend offer higher 
starting salaries to new doctorates.  So far, however, the 
percentage of doctorates choosing other careers has not 
declined, according to AACSB International. (Fields, 2006) 
3. Confronting the Shortage 
As one publication from the AACSB noted, “when it 
comes to attracting academically qualified faculty, we are 
deep in a seller’s market of pandemic proportions.” 
(Pulley, 2006)  “When you look at supply and demand for 
business faculty,” notes Sara Freedman, dean of Mississippi 
State University’s College of Business and Industry, “there 
are not enough faculty coming through the traditional 
doctoral programs to staff our programs. Yet, the ability 
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to recruit and retain faculty is central to strengthening 
programs.” (Tyson, Spring 03) 
Andrew Policano, business dean at the University of 
Wiconsin-Madison, and other administrators believe they are 
on the front edge of doctoral faculty crunch. Last year, 
Wisconsin left six positions vacant out of a dozen it was 
seeking to fill. “We have continuing vacancies from one 
year to the next. We use visitors, people on sabbatical who 
will be teaching half time, faculty who are taking a full 
visit, or younger doctoral students who have just finished 
dissertations and aren’t quite ready for permanent 
positions.” Policano said.(AACSB, 1998) 
Regardless of the actual number of Ph.D.s who may be 
in the pool, b-schools that consider themselves to be in a 
“top” echelon are not going to hire someone for their 
faculty who does not meet their standards. Thus, educators 
say, it is “stars,” young, middle-aged or older, who are 
being avidly pursued and wooed, not only by the top five, 
but by the top 10, 20, and 50.  “Compared to five or six 
years ago, more schools than just the top five now think 
they are really good schools and they want to only go after 
the best,” said Gautam Caul, associate dean and professor 
of finance at the University of Michigan. “The fact that 
there are vacancies left may not be so much an indication 
of potential candidates having gone down, but quality 
standards having gone up.” 
Stephen Lippmann, at the UCLA Andersen School of 
Business, has the same view. “We have openings and we would 
like to hire in a couple of fields. It’s not that there 
aren’t candidates to hire, it’s that meeting our 
expectations is harder. Everybody wants to hire the same 
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small set.”(AACSB, 1998)  Such intense competition for 
candidates at the upper tier schools takes talent away from 
the pool of candidates available to the second tier 
schools, which then forces less-endowed schools to reach 
down into the next tier, which reduces the pool the smaller 
schools have to choose from. “You just keep putting 
pressure further down in the pipeline,” Policano said. 
(AACSB, 1998) 
4. Turning to Non-Business and Contingent Faculty 
In light of this competition for talent, universities 
have shifted their hiring techniques to cope with the 
shortage of qualified faculty.  One avenue pursued has been 
to hire Ph.D.s from other disciplines and train them how to 
teach business courses. (Shinn, 2005) 
Business schools have also increased hiring of non-
tenure-track “clinical professors” as a way to gain 
practitioner expertise on their faculty as well as 
economize on salaries.(AACSB, 1998)  Primarily used to 
subsidize the increased teaching burden, these new hires 
typically devote little, if any, time to research and have 
no involvement with doctoral education programs. 
(Zimmerman, 2001) This can be a big concern because it 
makes it increasingly difficult for schools to maintain the 
research component of their missions.  Once business 
schools lose their research leaders, they may have 
difficulty hiring worthy replacements. (Fields, 2006)  If 
these schools are unable to maintain an adequate percentage 
of academically qualified faculty that perform research, 
they may also be unable to meet AACSB accreditation 
requirements. (Fields, 2006) 
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Wisconsin and Illinois report that they are adding 
some clinical faculty, but are doing so very carefully in 
order to maintain the balance with the high quality 
research faculty a leading institution must have. Howard 
Thomas, dean at the University of Illinois, noted, 
“Clinical faculty still have the aura of second-class 
citizens among doctoral, tenure-track faculty, but I really 
see them as playing a key role in providing quality, 
cutting edge instruction.” (AACSB, 1998) 
To fill vacant positions, other schools have turned to 
adjunct or visiting faculty. UCLA, as well as Stanford, 
Lippmann said, now hire five to 10 percent adjunct faculty. 
“These are excellent teachers with top quality experience.  
Thirty years ago we wouldn’t have looked at such a person.” 
(AACSB, 1998) 
F. FACULTY COMPENSATION 
Business school faculty members have traditionally 
enjoyed higher salaries than most of their counterparts in 
other academic fields, and the recent shortage in qualified 
business faculty has only increased this relative advantage 
in compensation.  According to a 2006 survey of 226,000 
faculty members at 844 public and private four-year 
colleges and universities, faculty in the business and 
management field earned the third-highest average salaries 
among the 32 different fields classified, ranking behind 
only legal studies and engineering. 
Figure 47 illustrates the average nine-month salary 
received by business school faculty, broken down by 
specific field and academic rank.  Note that academic 
salaries are generally reported in nine-month terms because 
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most faculty are only guaranteed nine-months of employment 
each year (some schools guarantee more, some less). Faculty 
commonly must seek additional internal or external funding 
for additional research or teaching for the remaining three 
months of the year (usually the summer).  Given that most 
faculty do, in fact, find such funding, however, the values 
in Figure 47 significantly under-represent the average 
salaries actually earned on an annual basis.(Chronicle, 
2006) 
Of particular note from Figure 47 is the fact that, 
overall, the average salary for new hires exceeds the 
salary for all faculty, especially at the tenured ranks. In 
some fields and ranks, the premium paid to new hires is 
quite significant. As the pool of high quality, freshly 
minted Ph.D.’s is diminishing; competition for associate 
and assistant professors is increasing.  Institutions that 
can afford to bid are becoming more aggressive in 
recruiting faculty from other schools, inflating salaries 
beyond what some can afford.(AACSB, 1998) 
Intense competition for new faculty is also reflected 
in increases in non-salary compensation (e.g. research 
funds and overload teaching). Business schools are also 
pursuing faculty at peer institution with job offers for 
family members, apartments and other perks.(AACSB, 1998) 
Wisconsin’s Policano sees it as a trickle down effect 
that begins with the top schools paying a higher price or 
offering more perks for a shrinking pool of faculty.  Each 
next layer of schools then reaches down into another tier 
of quality, with diminishing quality form a smaller and 
smaller pool.(AACSB, 1998)   
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Figure 47.   Average 9-Month Salary by Business Field and 
Rank (2005-06) ($ in 000’s) 













Finance / Banking 
/ Real Estate / 
Insurance 




118.2 159.2 95.9 109.9 92.6 87.5 58.7 44.8 
Accounting / 
Taxation 118.1 135.7 98.3 111.4 98.1 104.2 54.6 51.4 









/ Strategic Mgmt. 
115.3 110.6 91.8 99.1 87.8 88.9 52.3 50.2 




107.3 116.7 79.1 101.4 72.9 71.9 51.7 52.8 
All disciplines 
(including those 
not named above) 
117.1 121.1 93.7 105.0 91.0 91.8 53.6 50.8 
Source: AACSB International - ref 214. 
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“It’s crisis time for the public universities,” says 
Policano.  “We are on a razor’s edge and at any given 
moment, if the private schools with heavy endowments come 
and offer support for top faculty it would be very 
difficult to compete.”  (AACSB, 1998) 
Spiking salaries for doctorally qualified new hires 
has created a new problem: salary inversion.(Fields, 2006) 
UCLA, for example, is “very aggressive,” Lippmann said in 
recruiting rookies, often paying them more than three, 
four, and five-year faculty. “Not long ago, my 12 month 
salary was lower than a rookie’s and I’m a chaired 
professor.” (AACSB, 1998)Soon, it may not be uncommon for 
an associate professor with ten years of experience and a 
solid record of teaching, research, and service to earn 
$10,000 less than a new hire just brought on board.(Fields, 
2006)   Illinois' Thomas noted that, “People now retiring 
often have much lower salaries than those of starting 
professors.” (AACSB, 1998)  
It does not stop with new hires.  It affects the 
experienced faculty as well.  Rising salaries for new hires 
has encouraged experienced faculty to move to different 
institutions to receive pay raises of their own, and thus 
the market continues to stay extremely competitive. 
(LeClair, 2004)  This does not bode well for schools 
because the senior faculty who relocate are replaceable 
only at a significant premium over their current salaries, 
even if the successors are far more junior.  (AACSB, 2003) 
G. FACULTY CAREER CHOICE 
Given that most business school faculty members could 
be earning considerably greater compensation in the private 
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sector, it is important to understand why they would choose 
an academic career in the first place.  While not specific 
to business schools, Figure 48 provides the results of a 
survey of higher education faculty members regarding why 
they decided to pursue an academic career. While not 
surprising that “intellectual challenge” was the number one 
reason for pursuing an academic career, it is perhaps 
revealing that the next four reasons all relate to either 
intellectual or professional freedom. 
 
Figure 48.   Top Reasons Faculty Pursue an Academic 
Career 
Percentage of faculty identifying reason as “very 







Intellectual challenge 88.5% 89.2% 
Freedom to pursue scholarly/teaching 
interests 
83.0% 82.1% 
Intellectual freedom 81.4% 79.4% 
Autonomy 76.7% 77.4% 
Flexible schedule 67.6% 66.3% 
Opportunities for research 61.1% 61.4% 
Opportunities for teaching 60.0% 60.4% 






Source: Chronicle of Higher Education, Volume 50, Issue 1, 
Page A20 
 
It is the importance of intellectual freedom in higher 
education that motivates the institution of academic 
tenure, which provides a level of job security, which is 
quite rare in the American economy. Academic tenure, it is 
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argued, protects established teachers and researchers when 
they dissent from prevailing opinion or openly disagree 
with authorities within or outside the school. Thus 
academic tenure is similar to the lifetime tenure that 
protects some judges from external pressure. Without job 
security, the scholarly community as a whole might favor 
"safe" lines of inquiry. (Wikipedia, 2007) 
It is important to note, however, that universities 
also have economic rationales for adopting tenure systems. 
First, job security and the accompanying autonomy are 
significant employee benefits; without them, universities 
might have to pay higher salaries or take other measures to 
attract and retain faculty. Second, junior faculty are 
driven to establish themselves by the high stakes of the 
tenure decision (i.e., lifetime tenure vs. job loss), 
arguably helping to create a culture of excellence within 
the university. Finally, tenured faculty may be more likely 
to make “relationship-specific investments” of their time 
and energy in improving the universities where they expect 
to remain for life; they may also be more willing to hire, 
mentor and promote talented junior colleagues who could 
otherwise threaten their positions. Many of these 
rationales resemble those for senior partner positions in 
law and accounting firms. (Wikipedia, 2007) 
While the number two and three reasons that faculty 
choose academic careers in Figure 48 are associated with 
intellectual freedom, the number four and five reasons are 
clearly associated with professional or lifestyle freedom.  
Academic positions generally do not require faculty to 
“clock in and out,” to bill by the hour, to work normal 
business hours, or even to be physically located on campus 
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when conducting their work (other than the actual time 
spent in the classroom). Many faculty members, especially 
full-time faculty with tenure, operate with a minimum of 
supervision from their institutions and outside agencies, 
structuring their work as they want.(Gappa et al., 2007) A 
faculty career is hence one that is judged on product 
(research published, classes taught well, etc.), rather 
than process. 
The importance that academic faculty place on 
professional freedom was conveyed quite succinctly by NPS 
Associate Professor David Henderson recently when he noted 
that, “The reason that many of us became academics is 
because we get to choose when and where we do our 70 hours 
of work a week.” (Quoted by Associate Professor Peter 
Coughlan during interview.)  Professor Henderson’s quote 
captures well the tradeoff that faculty make when they 
choose an academic career: They are willing to work at jobs 
that require them to put in as much as 70 hours per week, 
but in return they expect to be given the freedom to work 
when, where, and how they see fit. 
H. FACULTY JOB SELECTION 
Perhaps not surprising given the “up or out” nature of 
tenure-track positions, business schools are constantly in 
pursuit of new faculty.  From 2002 and 2005, between seven 
and nine percent of all full-time faculty in U.S. business 
schools were new hires, with schools averaging around four 
new faculty members per year. (AACSB, 2006a; LeClair, 2004; 
Shinn, 2005) Almost 60 percent of new hires at business 
schools were experienced – that is, neither new doctorates 
nor candidates for doctorates known as “all but 
dissertation” (ABD’s). (LeClair, 2004) 
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For a view of the job selection process from the 
faculty perspective, Hunt (2004) conducted a survey among 
207 business school faculty members who had recently 
accepted employment at their first academic position (all 
had registered in the Academy of Management online job 
placement services).  Respondents had contacted an average 
of 31.1 schools in their job search and received an average 
of 3.8 on-campus interviews. (Hunt, 2004)  Male respondents 
reported 2.73 job offers and females had an average of 2.19 
job offers. Those who ended up accepting a position at a 
doctoral (i.e. research-oriented) school had received an 
average of 2.67 offers, while those at non-doctoral schools 
had 2.52 offers.  (Hunt, 2004) 
1. Why Faculty Choose to Work at a Particular School 
To assess the priorities of business and management 
faculty when selecting among potential academic employers, 
Hunt asked the respondents to his survey to rate the 
importance of 32 different factors on the decision to 
accept employment at their current school.(Hunt, 2004)  
Results for the 20 most important factors are given in 
Figure 49, separated between respondents at doctoral and 
non-doctoral schools.  
Among new faculty at both doctoral and non-doctoral 
institutions, teaching load (i.e. minimization of the 
number of different courses, segments, and/or terms that 
the faculty member would be required to teach) was the most 
important factor in determining which academic position to 
accept among competing offers. Moreover, teaching load was 
the number one factor by a quite significant margin among 
faculty at doctoral institutions. 
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Figure 49.   Importance of Factors in Accepting a 
Business School Faculty Position (7 point scale, 
7=extremely important,1=not at all important) 




Variable Mean Rank Mean Rank
Teaching load (number of courses,
segments, terms, etc.) 6.41 1 6.03 1 
Likelihood of obtaining tenure 6.00 2 5.78 3 
Compatibility with other faculty 5.93 3 5.95 2 
Spouse's evaluation of area 5.63 4,5 5.48 6 
Funding for research, research
assistants, & research time 5.63 4,5 5.20 12 
Criteria used for promotion and
tenure decisions 5.56 6,7 5.73 4 
Funding for travel to meetings 5.56 6,7 5.40 7 
Prestige of school or department 5.44 8 4.53 22 
Background, interests, & research 
orientation of the faculty 5.37 9 4.58 21 
Library and computer facilities 5.30 10 5.23 11 
Opportunity to teach desired courses 5.19 11 5.63 5 
Base salary 5.15 12 5.30 9 
Compatibility with department head 5.12 13 4.90 12 
Existence of Ph.D. program 4.96 14 2.44 32 
Fringe benefits package 4.85 15 4.63 17,18
Geographic location of school 4.74 16,17 5.33 8 
Availability of supplementary
research grants 4.74 16.17 4.10 25,26
Quality and motivation of students 4.70 18 4.75 14 
Cost of living in area 4.67 19 4.63 17,18
Physical facilities (e.g. faculty 
offices, classrooms etc.) 4.50 20 4.60 19,20
Source: Table 2 from ref 202 pg 60 & 61 
 
It is also of interest to note from Figure 49 that 
salary was only the 12th most important decision factor 
among new faculty at doctoral institutions and the 9th most 
important factor among new faculty at non-doctoral 
institutions. As William Nichols, associate dean at 
University of Norte Dame’s Mendoza College of Business, 
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noted, “Money alone doesn’t drive faculty recruitment, but 
it allows you to have a conversation with some of the best 
faculty in the United States.”(Tyson, Spring 03) 
Additional insight into job selection criteria among 
faculty was provided in research conducted by Trower 
(2002). Trower’s investigation into the job choices of new 
doctoral-degree recipients and new faculty in the first or 
second year of employment showed that faculty as well new 
Ph.D graduates prefer tenure-track appointments for the 
economic security and academic status they provide. 
Respondents also indicated, however, that they would select 
non-tenure-track appointments for the sake of geographical 
location, flexibility, and balance between teaching and 
research.(Gappa et al., 2007)  
2. Relocating to New Positions 
Given the fact that academic careers are often 
characterized by a number of “stops” at different 
institutions, it is important to examine the costs and 
incentives for faculty when they switch employers. 
First of all, academic careers have special switching 
costs associated with the tenure process.  Certainly, 
tenured faculty members are generally unlikely to switch 
employers and give up the job security of tenure unless 
their new employer is willing to offer them tenure as well.  
Offering immediate tenure to a faculty member at another 
institution, however, might be a difficult pill to swallow 
for the offering school, given that the faculty at the new 
institution must effectively choose a colleague for life 
despite having perhaps never worked closely with the 
individual. Untenured faculty on the tenure-track face a 
different sort of switching cost: The cost of starting 
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over.  When an assistant professor moves from one 
institution to another, his or her “tenure clock” is often 
either restarted or at least set back a number of years, 
pushing farther away the possible attainment of the “Holy 
Grail” of tenure. 
In light of these switching costs, Eaton and Hunt 
(2002) examined the reasons that faculty decide to 
relocate. Factors of importance were similar to those of 
new PhDs in Figure 49. Most relocating faculty members left 
their previous employment voluntarily. The main reasons 
were incompatibility with other faculty and spouse’s 
evaluation of the area. However, a number of respondents 
indicated that they were not dissatisfied, but had received 
an outstanding offer from another university. Those who 
left involuntarily either did not receive tenure or thought 
they would not in the future. (Hunt, 2004) 
Additional insight is provided from a survey of 
faculty members conducted by the U.S. Department of 
Education. In responding to a question about the most 
important characteristics of a new job if a faculty member 
were to leave his or her current institution, tenured and 
tenure-track faculty replied that tenure was very important 
(83 percent), followed by job security in general (71 
percent), and geographical location (70 percent).  These 
faculty members also placed a high priority on spousal 
employment (69 percent)(Gappa et al., 2007) 
I. FACULTY JOB SATISFACTION 
College and university faculty, as a whole, exhibit 
remarkably high levels of career and job satisfaction. In 
their responses to the 2004 National Survey of 
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Postsecondary Faculty, faculty members showed a high degree 
of satisfaction (87.5 percent) with their jobs overall, 
regardless of appointment, time base, institutional type, 
gender, or ethnic background.(Gappa et al., 2007)  Analysis 
of several Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of 
Teaching surveys conducted between 1969 and 1997 shows that 
for decades full-time faculty members have remained 
generally satisfied with their career choices and their 
institutions. Very few have indicated that they would 
change their profession if they had it to do over again. 
They have retained their positive attitudes about their 
academic careers even though their workloads have escalated 
and their salaries have not always kept pace with 
inflation. (Gappa et al., 2007) 
Moreover, the previously mentioned survey of recently 
hired business school faculty members conducted by Hunt 
indicated high levels of confidence that these new hires 
had indeed selected the right faculty position. On a scale 
of 1 to 7, with 7 representing that one was sure that he or 
she had chosen the correct offer, respondents at doctoral 
schools averaged 6.04, while the average for those at non-
doctoral schools was 6.19.(Hunt, 2004)  
The aspects of their career or particular academic 
position that faculty find most satisfying are illustrated 
by the survey results in Figure 50. “Autonomy and 
independence” ranks as the best aspect of their job by a 




Figure 50.   Top Reasons Faculty Are Satisfied with a 
Particular Academic Position 
Percentage of faculty identifying aspect of job as 







Autonomy and independence 88.4% 89.8% 
Job security 80.0% 81.3% 
Opportunity to develop new ideas 79.6% 82.7% 
Overall job satisfaction 73.6% 78.7% 
Professional relationships with other 
faculty members 
72.4% 75.3% 
Competency of colleagues 72.1% 76.4% 
Opportunity for scholarly pursuits 70.5% 73.3% 
Teaching load 62.5% 66.0% 
Office/lab space 61.4% 70.2% 
Social relationships with other faculty 
members 
57.1% 63.0% 
Relationships with administration 57.1% 61.3% 
Visibility for jobs at other 
institutions/organizations 
49.5% 52.8% 
Salary and fringe benefits 46.6% 56.3% 
Quality of students 44.0% 70.0% 
Source: Chronicle of Higher Education, Volume 50, Issue 1, 
Page A20 
 
1. Lower Satisfaction Among Untenured Tenure-Track 
Faculty 
The overall high level of job satisfaction among 
academic faculty may mask lower levels of satisfaction 
among particular groups, however. Indeed, a survey of 
untenured tenure-track faculty members at six research 
universities led to less positive results. In this case, 25 
percent responded that they were either dissatisfied of 
very dissatisfied with their college or university as a 
place to work (Trower and Bleak 2004). This population of 
early career faculty in highly competitive environments may 
have included a significant proportion of individuals who 
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were in the process of determining whether they really 
wanted to continue building their careers in the academy.  
New tenure-track faculty members enter their academic 
careers because they believe that faculty work involves 
autonomy, flexibility, freedom to pursue academic 
interests, and opportunities to serve society through 
education. Unfortunately, what early career faculty members 
hope for does not fully match what they actually experience 
(Rice, 1996b; Rice, Sorcinelli, and Austin, 2000). Olsen 
(1993) found that satisfaction with faculty work actually 
declined over the first several years of a tenure-track 
appointment, and that this decline was accompanied by an 
increase in job-related stress attributed to conflicts 
involving time and work-life balance.(Gappa et al., 2007)  
Early-career faculty have reported finding the tenure 
process and its expectations mystifying (Rice, Sorcinelli, 
and Austin, 2000; Austin and Rice 1998). Over and over 
again, researchers on the topic have heard comments such as 
“Everything is so vague, ambiguous, and illusive” or “There 
is no steady, reliable feedback” or “I cannot get a good 
read on what it takes to get tenure” (Rice, Sorcinelli, and 
Austin, 2000). One new faculty member succinctly referred 
to the tenure process as “archery in the dark” (Rice, 
1996b, p.31). 
For many untenured tenure-track faculty members, the 
rigidity of the tenure timeline is the most critical aspect 
of the tenure process (Austin and Rice, 1998).  As 
performance expectations continue to increase, funding 
opportunities are decreasing, and this gap is causing 
greater competition for grants to support research in some 
fields. Academic journals’ review processes and schedules 
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often result in long delays before authors are notified 
about receipt of their work, much less about its 
acceptance, and there may be even longer delays until an 
accepted manuscript appears in print.(Gappa et al., 2007)  
The end result of the tenure process is that “people 
stagger to the end of the tenure review” (Tierney and 
Bensimon, 1996, p. 73).  If they attain tenure, they feel 
relieved rather than elated.  One respondent, the first to 
have gained tenure in his school in ten years, said, “It’s 
been dehumanizing … I’m disheartened by the whole thing”; 
another commented, “I’ve got it. I will never give it up, 
because I would never put my family through that again. 
Never” (Tierney and Bensimon, 1996. p.73).  
2. Sacrificing Family and Personal Life for the 
Academic Career 
Many faculty members report that they face constant 
pressure to turn their attention in too many different 
directions, and that they find the pace of work hectic and 
relentless (Rice, Sorcinelli, and Austin 2000).  Many new 
faculty members, and graduate students aspiring to be 
faculty members, are expressing concern about what they 
perceive to be increasing expectations for higher levels of 
productivity. The often report feeling pulled in many 
directions simultaneously and wonder whether they can find 
workable ways to manage their personal and professional 
responsibilities. (Gappa et al., 2007) 
All faculty members, but especially new tenure-track 
faculty, face multiple demands on their time as well as 
high expectations for their accomplishment in teaching, 
research and service.  Their time at work is fragmented 
among diverse and conflicting priorities: students expect 
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excellent faculty performance in the classroom: senior 
colleagues seek these new colleagues’ participation in 
departmental, campus, and professional service; and new 
tenure-track faculty members simultaneously must produce 
research and scholarly work. (Gappa et al., 2007) 
Consequently, the total hours which full-time tenure-track 
faculty work weekly at their institutions have increased. 
The average work week for full-time tenure-track faculty 
across all disciplines has increased from 51 hours in 1988 
to 56 hours in 2003 at research universities, from 46 to 53 
at comprehensive institutions, and from 41 to 50 at all 
other institutions.(Gappa et al., 2007)  The percentage of 
faculty members reporting that they work more than 55 hours 
a week has grown from 13 percent in 1972 to 47 percent in 
2003.(Gappa et al., 2007)  While these figures indicate the 
increasing workload of faculty overall, the problem is 
considered particularly acute at business schools, where a 
shrinking supply of professors are often pulled in many 
different directions as they are asked to teach more 
classes, conduct more research, and become more involved 
with students and business communities.(Fairbank et al., 
2005) 
The negative impact of these increased work demands on 
the family and personal lives of faculty members is 
indicated by the survey data in Figure 51.  The top two 
sources of stress among faculty members relate to lack of 




Figure 51.   Top Sources of Stress among Faculty Members, 
Compared by Gender 
Source of Stress Males Females 
Lack of Personal Time 68.5% 81.9% 
Management of Household 
Responsibilities 68.0% 81.8% 
Teaching Load 61.6% 70.8% 
Committee Work 54.7% 61.1% 
Tenure review/Promotion Process 40.3% 50.8% 
Source: Page 109 of Ref 208 
 
In other survey work, finding enough time to do their 
work was one of the most frequently mentioned sources of 
stress among early-career faculty in a range of 
institutional types (Rice, Sorcinellie, and Austin, 2000). 
Some graduate students and new faculty, as they observe the 
stress and long hours that characterize the work lives of 
their senior colleagues, have expressed uncertainty about 
wanting to continue pursuing their academic careers.(Gappa 
et al., 2007)  
The academic career therefore is paradoxical. Despite 
its advantages of independence and flexibility, it is 
psychologically difficult.  The lack of ability to limit 
work, the tendency to compare oneself primarily to the 
exceptional giants in one’s field, and the high incidence 
of overload make it particularly difficult for academics to 
find a satisfactory integration of work with private life.  
It is the unbounded nature of the academic career that is 
the heart of the problem. Time is critical for professors, 
because there is not enough of it to do all the things 
their job requires: teaching, research, and institutional 
and professional service.  It is therefore impossible for 
faculty members to protect other aspects of their lives, 
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and work tends to dominate.  These factors help to explain 
why 31 percent of faculty are considering work outside the 





Perhaps the number one area of graduate management 
education that will see revisions in the years ahead is the 
curriculum itself, with an emphasis on offering increased 
flexibility through expanded programs.(Fairbank et al., 
2005)   The idea is that with more options available to 
choose from, students will be enticed by the opportunity to 
design their own educational experience by selecting 
courses that interest them.  This is in direct opposition 
to the old model of taking a course load that has already 
been designed by the school.  This new strategy has been 
the primary tactic for lower-tier schools seeking a 
competitive advantage against the larger schools.  Now, 
even top-ranked schools recognize the validity in the 
strategy and are scrapping the “one-size-fits-all” model in 
favor of the new customizable models that emphasize 
flexibility and individuality.(Lavelle & Lehman, 2006)  
According to a 2004 survey by AACSB International, about 
300 business schools were planning either to add academic 
programs or substantially revise their curricula.  More 
than 50 schools had already made revisions.   
The origins of the MBA industry are rooted in a time 
when communications technology was much more limited than 
it is today.  The limitations of technology necessitated 
that post-graduate education take place on campus and 
physically in the presence of the faculty. Today, 
technology and buyer demand have evolved to provide 
educational options that were not available in the past.  
These options have a direct affect on the market for post-
graduate education and are valid substitutes for 
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traditional business schools. As one source noted, “The 
industry is no longer monolithic. Business education is 
delivered in a fragmented market-place and in multiple 
formats.” (AACSB, 2002)   
Traditional university-based business schools account 
for only a fraction of the broad management education 
industry.(AACSB, 2002)  Filling MBA seats has become more 
difficult as students have more and more MBA choices. 
(Bisoux, 2006) The number of applications to traditional 
full-time programs decreased at 78 percent of business 
schools in the 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 academic years, 
according to the Graduate Management Admissions 
Council.(Pulley, 2006)   Across the industry it is becoming 
more apparent that, more and more, students have rigorous 
and demanding work and family schedules that require the 
need for more creative program alternatives in terms of 
scheduling and content. (Bisoux, 2006) 
There are many forms of education or training that 
might be considered as substitutes to the traditional 
residential MBA program.  A review of current literature 
published by trade magazines, accreditation reports and 
weekly periodicals points to executive programs, corporate 
universities, and non-traditional business schools (part 
time, satellite campuses or online) as the substitutes that 
claim the biggest share of prospective MBA students.   
A. CORPORATE UNIVERSITIES 
Corporate Universities were once thought of as 
glorified training departments.   They have evolved to 
become much more strategic in focus and are key 
contributors in helping the parent organization achieve 
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goals through education.   The corporate university exists 
to accomplish the following objectives: 
(1) teach topics like leadership and 
communication to executives; 
(2) standardize skills and knowledge for certain 
jobs within the company; 
(3) help the company as a whole develop a unified 
culture; and 
(4) develop strong networks among 
employees.”(Shinn, 2004b)     
Achieving these objectives in support of corporate 
strategy requires an education-based approach as opposed to 
training based approach. 
In a survey of 2,570 employees, 64 percent say their 
company provides some type of in-house training for 
educational/career development.(GMAC, ) Of the over 1600 
companies nationwide that have instituted their own version 
of corporate universities, many have implemented the robust 
curricula necessary to educate rather than train.  A 
sampling of course offerings include: Industry Trends, 
Customers and Competitors, Business Strategies, Best 
Practices, Creative Problem Solving and Leadership 
Development.  The educational philosophy, as employed by 
the corporate university, tailors the curricula to provide 
only courses of value to the company’s objectives. 
Corporate Universities now pose an important threat to 
traditional management and business schools.(Gary, 1998)    
The threat implied is that employers can streamline 
education and training to provide the company specific 
need-to-know information.  While this may not provide the 
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well rounded education that a traditional business school 
could provide, it satisfies corporate requirements without 
the increase in salary that an MBA would command and allows 
the employee to train at the company’s convenience. 
Traditional business schools have taken this threat 
seriously.  Many, in fact, have changed strategies to 
account for this threat.  A common example of strategy 
change to remain competitive is diversification, which is 
being achieved through partnerships.  These partnerships 
capitalize on the combination of business industry 
knowledge, which is a stalwart of the b-school curricula, 
and the specific educational needs that corporations need 
to advance their strategic goals.  MBA providers have even 
begun to partner themselves with corporations in designing 
company specific MBAs or other training courses.  In 
essence these partnerships “lean out” the traditional MBA 
process by identifying the value stream and providing only 
the subject matter in which the company finds value. 
B. NON-TRADITIONAL 
This category includes methods of delivery such as E 
learning and non-resident MBA.  American MBA programs are 
challenged with the plethora of options available to 
prospective students.  MBA programs are proliferating in 
other parts of the world, part-time programs are increasing 
in popularity, and online programs have proven remarkably 
alluring.(Greenbaum, 2006) 
These programs tend to be more accommodating to 
working professionals and students with scheduling needs.  
(Syed, 2006) Non-traditional schools such as University of 
Phoenix and Webster provide the majority of their education 
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through satellite campuses and online offerings.  They 
distribute learning to those who might not otherwise have 
sought postgraduate education. The convenience of their 
offerings almost certainly siphons off some students from 
traditional business schools. Moreover, these providers 
argue that their accreditation makes their degree as 
valuable as any other accredited school. In addition, the 
convenience of local campuses and Internet courses can, for 
some prospective students or employers, outweigh the 
reputation of traditional business schools.   
Part-time MBA programs at AACSB member schools in the 
U.S. (excluding executive MBA programs and distance 
education programs) represent 58 percent of these schools’ 
MBA program enrollment.(AACSB, 2002)  This statistic 
illustrates the appeal of non-traditional delivery methods.   
It is logical to assume that this 58% represents both 
potential students of full-time residential business 
schools as well as students who might not otherwise have 
pursued an MBA.   The power and appeal of non-traditional 
delivery methods provide opportunities for traditional 
schools to diversify to remain competitive.  With the 
infrastructure already in place (faculty, curriculum, 
facilities, etc.) many traditional schools discovered that 
diversifying to offer part time programs is essential to 
retain the necessary revenue to continue operations.  
Recent statistics show that more than 48 percent of 
American Business schools now offer online MBAs.(Economist 
Staff, 2004) 
The trend to diversify in methods of education 
delivery has been necessary.  Consider that upstarts such 
as the Universities of Phoenix and Webster both have annual 
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enrollments of around 4,000 and 7,000 full and part-time 
MBA students, respectively.(AACSB, 2002) In 1999, the 
University of Phoenix awarded 3,473 business master’s 
degrees at 11 U.S. campuses and another 1,430 through its 
online arm.(AACSB, 2002) The national presence gained by 
University of Phoenix in just a few years, and in spite of 
its detractors, has built market capital of more than $13 
billion and established more than 140 campuses.(Westerbeck, 
2004)  These types of success stories in the non-
traditional market will continue to erode the enrollment of 
the traditional schools who fail to find strategies that 
allow them to compete.   
C. EXECUTIVE EDUCATION  
Executive Education provides a heading to capture both 
degree and non-degree granting programs that are aimed at 
mid-career professionals.  Both are similar to non-
traditional programs in that they are accommodating to 
working professionals and may provide more flexibility than 
traditional school offerings.  These programs provide yet 
another substitute that potential traditional MBA students 
may consider. 
1. Degree Granting Executive Education 
These are accredited curricula administered by degree 
granting institutions that cater to mid-career 
professionals.  The time requirement is less than that of a 
traditional MBA. One of the key differences between 
executive and traditional full-time programs, however, is 
the limited or lack of opportunity to specialize in an 
executive program.(Syed, 2006)  
Given that these Executive MBAs (or EMBAs) target mid-
career individuals, it is not surprising that these 
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programs attract older students.(Syed, 2006)   The average 
age of executive education applicants is 34.3 year old. 
2. Non-Degree Granting Executive Education 
This training does not lead to accreditation but does 
teach valuable skills.  The trade off is between having 
employees learn a skill to keep them current in a dynamic 
environment or to facilitate their progression in the 
company hierarchy.  Helping the students learn a skill will 
enable them to remain current in the respective field and 
may even give them an advantage in career advancement. 
D. CONCLUSION 
It is fair to ask if the value of a traditional MBA 
may have slipped in the opinions of some employers.   
Increased supply of alternate methods of higher education 
points to evidence that this may be true. The increased 
availability of substitutes could not be sustained if 
demand did not increase at a comparable rate. 
There is, however, a scenario that might offer a 
counter to this perspective.  It may simply be that the 
demand for resident graduate business education has 
remained constant (with adjustments for population 
increases) and the demand for substitutes is created mostly 
among customers who would not have pursued a traditional 
MBA in the first place. 
Either way, statistics show that nontraditional 
programs attract the vast majority of MBA enrollments in 
the U.S.  In the 2003-2004 academic year, only 24 percent 
of MBA enrollments at AACSB-member schools in the U.S. were 
in traditional two-year programs. In 2004-2005, that number 
slipped to slightly more than 21 percent. Enrollment in 
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part-time evening and weekend MBA programs ticked up to 
63.7 percent in 2004-2005 from 61.2 percent in 2003-2004. 
(Bisoux, 2006) 
Because substitutes draw students from traditional 
programs, the traditional programs have had to diversify by 
assimilating attributes of the substitutes to remain 
competitive.  Traditional b-schools now recognize the 
revenue generating potential of adding part time and 
executive programs to their offerings.  Part-time programs 
also help schools achieve cost efficiency and prevent 
competitors from stealing market share.(Fairbank et al., 
2005) 
While there are conditions that illustrate the 
competition for the same prospective student between the 
traditional and non-traditional school, there is also 
evidence that they are sometimes after different customers.  
An analysis of GMAT data by GMAC revealed that the average 
age of part time applicants is 29 years old with an average 
GMAT score of 490.  Full time applicants average 26 years 
of age with an average GMAT score of 540.(Syed, 2006) 
This same survey, however, found evidence of some 
overlap in the target customer base. In particular, 34% of 
respondents who considered a full time two-year traditional 
MBA program also considered a full time one year 
accelerated program, 16% considered a part time program, 
10% considered an EMBA program, and 7% considered an 
online/distance-learning program.(MBA.com, 2005a) 
There are full time (traditional) universities that 
have no incentive to diversify.  They are fully capable of 
remaining competitive on reputation and published rankings 
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while selling to a student demographic which values the 
opportunity to be fully immersed and take advantage of 
program offerings such as career services (including campus 
interviews), career counseling, social and professional 
clubs, and other “campus life” events, like an executive 
speaker series.(Syed, 2006) 
However, mid-tier traditional business schools have 
already started diversifying to include part time and on 
line offerings.  Catering to this market and claiming a 
portion of the prospective students that don’t have the 
option of full-time education is a must for some schools to 
remain competitive in today’s market.  
Figure 52 shows that full-time MBAs incur large 
opportunity costs associated with leaving the full-time 
workforce for nearly two years.  Consequently, their total 
costs are large ($146,725) compared to the part-time 
($33,726) and executive programs ($37,293).  Thus, the ROI 
is much higher for part-time and executive graduates and 
the payback period is much shorter.(Holtom & Inderrieden, 
2006)  As seen in Figure 53, however, MBA graduates who 
attended part-time or executive MBA programs are less 
likely to rate the value of their degree as “outstanding” 




Figure 52.   Impact of Program Type 
Variable Full-Time Part-Time Executive
Pre-MBA Salary $49,329 $57,301 $77,609 
Post-MBA Salary $78,221 $78,287 $91,026 
Total Cost $146,725 $33,726 $37,293 
Net Increase in Salary $28,892 $20,986 $13,417 
Percent Increase in Salary 59% 37% 17% 
10-Year Gain from MBA $362,228 $263,110 $168,217 
Return on Investments (ROI) 147% 680% 351% 
Annualized ROI 15% 68% 35% 
Payback Period (years) 5.1 1.6 2.8 
 




(n = 2,048) 
Part-Time 
(n = 533) 
Executive 
(n = 215) 
Outstanding 27% 13% 23% 
Excellent 34% 30% 35% 
Good 25% 36% 29% 
Fair 9% 14% 8% 
Poor 5% 7% 5% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
*p < .05; Items in bold significantly affect the overall X2 statistic of 
the contingency table. 
 
Typically, almost two-thirds of part-time MBA students 
are receiving some form of financial subsidy from an 
employer, according to a 2000 survey by AACSB International 




As the requirement for business knowledge expands, the 
opportunity for participants to enter the market expands.  
Most new participants will not enter the market to directly 
challenge industry leaders.  They will enter the market to 
offer very specific or focused offerings that appeal to 
sub-sets of traditional school’s potential students.  The 
substitute offerings may be inferior in quality and provide 
less benefit than what a traditional school offers.  
However, less quality or inferior product does not mean 
less value.   
Buyers will evaluate trade-offs between the 
convenience of acquiring a product that is “good enough” 
and the rigid constraints of an education that might be 
overkill.  Substitutes that offer these types of trade-offs 
are becoming more relevant and are finding niches in the 
market that draw students away from traditional 
institutions. 
The ways that traditional business schools deal with 
substitutes is critical to their survival.  As upstarts 
deliver business education through the Internet or 
satellite campuses, or provide a unique training that 
enhances business skills of employees, there becomes less 
of a potential student pool.  Traditional business schools 
have for the most part, dealt with substitutes in three 
ways: ignore, straddle or switch.   
Some of the top-ranked business schools have little 
need to worry about substitutes.  The power of the brands 
at top schools such as Wharton or Harvard suggests very 
little threat from an online school.  Only Harvard has a 
license to sell Harvard degrees, and Harvard has no 
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intention of mass-producing MBAs.  Consumer demand for the 
“Harvard brand MBA” will always outpace the supply.  
University of Phoenix or local corporate universities are 
not in the market for Harvard MBA seekers.   
The same threat to mid and lower tier schools, 
however, is real.  The online and distance learning schools 
target the same students that would otherwise attend these 
schools.  The lower tiered schools often have to diversify 
their offerings or “straddle.”  This means that they would 
continue to offer traditional education but would expand to 
offer alternative distribution methods to maintain a 
student population that can sustain operations.    
Traditional business schools may even exercise the 
option to challenge the substitutes in their own market.  
If a school were to find that continuation of traditional 
business school services were not profitable (or 
sustainable), changing strategy to deliver education 
through an alternate means would be a viable option.  As 
students demand more flexibility and fewer can afford the 
two-year hiatus to attend school, traditional business 
schools can find their pool of potential full time students 
too shallow to support the weight of a bricks and mortar 
operation.  While the buildings and classrooms of a 
traditional school might become excess property, the core 
competencies of teaching and research are still valuable 
commodities that can be sold through alternate distribution 
channels such as distance learning or online services. 
Substitutes are a factor that traditional business 
schools must address.  Non-traditional methods can siphon-
off potential students to the point that an exclusive full-
time residential program cannot sustain itself by 
137 
traditional means. Traditional schools have to understand 
the threat of substitutes to their position in the market.  
This understanding will provide the direction for future 
strategy in an attempt to remain relevant and continue 
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VII. ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. ANALYSIS OF GSBPP IN RELATION TO THE MBA MARKET 
ANALYSIS 
One of the drawbacks that the GSBPP faces is the fact 
that the MBA industry is driven by reputation.  Reputation 
is driven by rankings in the various publications cited in 
Chapter 3.  Rankings are driven by student and faculty 
preferences, recruiter and employer preferences, admission 
standards, GMAT scores, and graduates’ salaries, just to 
name a few criteria.  However, the underlying factor in 
each of these categories is that the schools that dominate 
the Top 20 in rankings from year-to-year are the programs 
that have been around for quite a long time and have 
“ambassadors,” if you will, that champion the name of the 
program in the real world.   
For example, the business world has been exposed to 
many Harvard MBAs that have collectively established the 
reputation of the Harvard Business School as a quality MBA 
program.  This draws more students to apply because they 
feel the Harvard MBA will get them whatever it is they want 
(more money, access to a new career, and so on).  In turn, 
Harvard now has a broader range of students to choose from.  
So, they are able to pick more of the high-caliber students 
and less of the low-caliber students.  Consequently, the 
students do better because they started out more qualified.  
Then Harvard MBA graduates go out in the business 
world and excel, not necessarily because of the Harvard 
MBA, but because they were high-caliber to begin with.  
Regardless of why they succeed, the fact is that they do 
and this further bolsters the reputation of the Harvard 
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Business School because the rest of the world doesn’t see 
these students’ credentials prior to going to Harvard.  All 
the world sees is that these Harvard MBAs are excelling.  
So now the demand for Harvard MBAs goes up because 
businesses want them.  So, more students apply to the 
Harvard Business School and the cycle repeats itself.   
Unfortunately, for the non-ranked or new schools, the 
reverse is true.  Fewer high-caliber and more low-caliber 
students (probably those that got rejected from the higher-
ranked schools) attend the non-ranked or new schools.  So, 
they have less to choose from and one can draw conclusions 
where it goes from there.  The impact of MBA program 
reputations creates both a “virtuous cycle” and “vicious 
cycle” at the same time. 
So, for the GSBPP, which only initiated the MBA in 
2002 and only had its first graduating class in 2003, it 
faces a difficult task if it aims to break into the Top 20 
or even top 50 rankings.  Because it is still in its 
introductory stages, there haven’t been a lot of the 
“ambassadors” out there from GSBPP who can carry the banner 
of the school and who can vouch for the quality of the 
program.(Trevino, Lertangtam, & Viera, 2004)   This, 
coupled with the fact that there is no GMAT requirement for 
admissions, and the fact that only military officers (U.S. 
or foreign) and DoD civilians can attend, does not bode 
well for the hope of ever being ranked highly (or for 
qualifying for these rankings at all).   
The fact that the GSBPP has been successful in gaining 
accreditation is a step in the right direction.  
Unfortunately, there are too many things out of the realm 
of its control to ever gain access into the upper echelon 
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of the MBA elite, at least in terms of rankings.  The 
accreditation serves more to validate its graduates and 
entice officers to choose the GSBPP over civilian schools 
when choosing to pursue an MBA, than it does to compete 
with other MBA programs. 
The GSBPP also faces budgetary constraints that most 
other programs do not face.  As noted previously, most 
universities understand that tuition only covers a fraction 
of the costs of running the MBA program.  They rely on 
additional funding from sources such as endowments from 
alumni, donations, government subsidies, and executive MBA 
programs, consulting fees, and research funding.  The 
endowments constitute the bulk of the supplemental income.  
The only limit on this additional funding is the generosity 
of the alumni.  Thus, if a program needs additional funding 
to expand, they can organize a fund raising drive and offer 
to name buildings after alumni and whatnot.   
The GSBPP, on the other hand, is to a large degree 
constrained to its portion of the overall budget at NPS, 
and the NPS budget is constrained by what the DoN allocates 
and what the other services provide in terms of tuition.  
They also have access to research funding, but since the 
majority of the research projects are for the DoD, the pool 
of money that the funds providers possess is limited as 
well.  The DoD does not have the same access to capital 
resources as IBM.  So, research funding is constrained as 
well.   
Most noticeably, however, is the lack of sizeable 
endowments from alumni.  Beyond the NPS Foundation, a large 
pool of funds from philanthropic alumni doesn’t exist to 
provide steady funding for GSBPP, or NPS for that matter. 
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If the GSBPP wants to expand the programs it offers, there 
are very limited channels that it can access to alleviate 
funding shortfalls.  Thus, the GSBPP cannot be expected to 
compete on the same level as the dominant MBA programs. 
Another burden facing the GSBPP is the competition for 
renowned professors that also assist in making a name for 
the MBA program.  As pointed out previously, demand for 
faculty is up and so is the price.  Unfortunately, due to 
the congressional cap on what GSBPP can pay professors, it 
falls out of the realm of competitiveness for faculty 
salaries at the Associate Professor and Assistant Professor 
ranks.  With the additional stresses that the strong local 
economy put on faculty members, especially in the housing 
market, it further limits the pool of applicants to those 
who are uniquely interested in defense-focused research or 
those who love the Monterey area.   
The defense-focused niche also limits the applicant 
pool of professors.  When young professors are hired to the 
GSBPP, there is no guarantee of acceptance on the tenure 
track.  So, prior to being approved for the tenure track, a 
professor must conduct a certain amount of research in the 
defense area.  With no guarantee of acceptance or of tenure 
once accepted onto the tenure track, there is little 
incentive to perform DoD-relevant research.  This is for 
the simple reason that faculty are leery of being 
pigeonholed as a defense-focused professor by the broader 
academic community. 
A professor gains credibility in his/her discipline 
based on the research he or she conducts and publishes in 
that discipline.  If junior faculty members primarily 
conduct defense-focused research that is loosely tied, at 
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best, to their discipline during the early years of their 
careers and they do not get tenure from the GSBPP, they 
stand the chance of either being seen as an outsider from 
the mainstream academic community or at least being behind 
the power curve at their next place of employment.  Thus, 
incentives do not match up between all professors and the 
GSBPP defense-focused MBA niche that is desired. 
Lastly, in regards to what the GSBPP can do to curtail 
the threat of substitutes, it is doing all that it can.  By 
branching out into distance education, GSBPP is taking full 
advantage of the constraints it faces.  As mentioned in the 
Chapter 6 analysis, there are basically three basic avenues 
to address the threat of substitutes.  You can stop doing 
what you do and start doing only what the substitutes do, 
you can do both (called straddling), or you can ignore the 
substitutes and focus on what you’re already doing. 
Given the constrained resources and how the GBSPP 
falls under the NPS mission, dropping the resident MBA and 
focusing only on distance learning or executive education 
would not be feasible. Because of how the GSBPP is 
geographically isolated from operating bases, offering a 
part-time MBA is not feasible either.  There is no large 
pool of officers in the local area that can attend night 
classes or weekend classes, and since only officers can 
attend, civilians can’t come here at night or on the 
weekends to take courses either.  You have to be stationed 
in Monterey to have access to the GSBPP and you have to be 
accepted into the full-time resident MBA program to get 
stationed here. 
To focus solely on the resident MBA is not the right 
approach either.  Due to the geographical isolation of NPS, 
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there are students who desire to earn an MBA, but do not 
have access to the GSBPP.  So, instead of ignoring them 
and, consequently, forcing them to seek a MBA from 
competitors, the smart avenue is to reach out to them 
through distance education.  Ignoring them would only hurt 
the image of the GSBPP.  For an infant program seeking 
distinction, turning away students who desire to 
participate in the MBA program offered is a poor strategy.   
Trying to break into executive education is another 
smart move.  Currently executive education at NPS is taught 
primarily at the Center for Continuing Education (CCE).  
The CCE is located in the same building as the GSBPP yet, 
as of now, there is no direct affiliation with the GSBPP 
faculty, although moves are being made to incorporate GSBPP 
influence into the CCE.  This effort would expand GSBPP’s 
avenues for funding as well as its overall reputation 
without incurring too much additional cost. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Unlike other disciplines, business schools are torn 
between two market realities: they must provide academic 
value to their campus communities and meet the demands of 
business for more immediate corporate training.(Bisoux, 
2004)   Graduate education is not about training, yet 
early-career employers often want exactly this.  This 
speaks of trade-offs.  The GSBPP is not immune to this 
contradiction of desires.  Officers want an MBA that will 
educate them in a way that will create future opportunities 
for them whether they are in the military or private 
sector.  Faculty members want to teach them how to innovate 
with new ideas and be creative at problem solving.  Both 
focus on the “big picture” and on the students’ future 
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application of their graduate education.  On the contrary, 
the services want officers that can step in immediately and 
create value in a certain billet, with minimal future 
focus.  
The question of how to bridge this divide is one that 
is causing controversy in the MBA industry.  For the GSBPP, 
however, the niche strategy of being a defense-focused MBA 
has served to satisfy both parties. By offering the typical 
MBA curriculum that is accredited, officers get what they 
want in an MBA education. The professors get to teach their 
students how to think analytically and critically and apply 
proven problem solving techniques in ambiguous situations.  
By making the courses defense-focused and offering certain 
specialized courses, the services get what they want in 
officers prepared to go out and make an immediate impact.  
By offering the distance education, the GSBPP is able to 
reach officers that desire to attend NPS but cannot for 
some reason or another.  The GSBPP functions, in many 
respects, as the DoD’s corporate university. 
This niche strategy that the GSBPP has adopted is a 
reasonable strategy for competing in the MBA industry.  
When considering the constraints that the GSBPP faces in 
regards to inability to compete in the rankings game, the 
students that are allowed attend, the cost constraints that 
it faces, and the ability to face the threats of 
substitutes, there are few other viable options.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The most significant limitation that the defense-
focused niche places on the GSBPP is in terms of the 
faculty.  In today’s market of increased demand for faculty 
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due to the dwindling amount of doctoral professors, salary 
becomes an important incentive to attract professors.  As 
already noted, the GSBPP is constrained in its ability to 
be competitive in salaries that it offers to senior 
professors.  This is due to congressional ceilings.  
Perhaps the most important incentive valued by faculty is 
freedom.  The original intent of the alternating quarters 
for teaching and researching was designed to provide the 
faculty enough freedom to focus on research without being 
bogged down by teaching requirements.  Unfortunately, not 
being fully staffed has heaped additional teaching 
requirements onto the already full laps of the faculty, 
while the limited supply and scope of available research 
funding has constrained the true academic freedom that 
faculty enjoy when they are not required to teach. 
The one recommendation that this paper offers is to 
initiate a thorough investigation on ways to improve the 
salary, incentive package, or a combination of the two that 
is offered to professors.  This would entice proven faculty 
to seek a tenure-track position with the GSBPP and attract 
proven faculty from other schools who would otherwise be 
put off by the lack of salary incentive. 
The other aspect of this investigation should be to 
see what could be done to revamp the instruction/research 
scheduling system in order to unburden the faculty and 
allow them more time to conduct general academic research.  
This would be another aspect that would entice current 
faculty to stay and attract new faculty that normally would 
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EXCERPTS FROM SECTION 2 (pages 13-17): 
 
STANDARDS FOR BUSINESS ACCREDITATION 
 
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT STANDARDS 
 
1: The school publishes a mission statement or its 
equivalent that provides direction for making decisions. 
[MISSION STATEMENT] 
 
2: The school’s mission statement is appropriate to higher 
education for management and consonant with the mission of 
any institution of which the school is part.  The mission 
includes the production of intellectual contributions that 
advance the knowledge and practice of business and 
management. [MISSION APPROPRIATENESS] 
 
3: The mission statement or supporting documents specify 
the student populations the school intends to serve. 
[STUDENT MISSION] 
 
4: The school specifies action items that represent high 
priority continuous improvement efforts. [CONTINUOUS 
IMPROVEMENT OBJECTIVES] 
 
5: The school has financial strategies to provide resources 
appropriate to, and sufficient for, achieving its mission 




6: The policies for admission to business degree programs 
offered by the school are clear and consistent with the 
school’s mission. [STUDENT ADMISSION] 
 
7: The school has academic standards and retention 
practices that produce high quality graduates. [STUDENT 
RETENTION] 
 
8: The school maintains a staff sufficient to provide 
stability and ongoing quality improvement for student 
support activities. [STAFF SUFFICIENCY—STUDENT SUPPORT] 
 
9: The school maintains a faculty sufficient to provide 
stability and ongoing quality improvement for instructional 
programs offered. [FACULTY SUFFICIENCY] 
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10: The faculty has, and maintains, intellectual 
qualifications and current expertise to accomplish the 
mission… [FACULTY QUALIFICATIONS] 
 
11: The school has well-documented and communicated 
processes in place to manage and support faculty members 
over the progression of their careers consistent with the 
school’s mission, to include: 
 
• …the expectations the school holds for them on all 
mission-related activities. 
• Providing orientation, guidance and mentoring. 
• Undertaking formal periodic review, promotion, and 
reward processes. 
• Maintaining overall plans for faculty resources. 
[FACULTY MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT] 
 
12: The business school’s faculty…share responsibility to: 
 
• Ensure adequate time is devoted to learning 
activities… 
• Ensure adequate student-faculty contact… 
• Set high expectations for academic achievement… 
• Evaluate instructional effectiveness and overall 
student achievement. 
• Continuously improve instructional programs. 
• Innovate in instructional processes. 
[AGGREGATE FACULTY AND STAFF EDUCATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY] 
 
13: Individual teaching faculty members: 
 
• Operate with integrity in their dealings with students 
and colleagues. 
• Keep their own knowledge current with the continuing 
development of their teaching disciplines. 
• Actively involve students in their learning process. 
• Encourage collaboration and cooperation among 
participants. 
• Ensure frequent, prompt, feedback on student 
performance. 
[INDIVIDUAL FACULTY EDUCATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY] 
 
 
14: Individual Students: 
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• Operate with integrity in their dealings with faculty 
and other students. 
• Engage the learning materials with appropriate 
attention and dedication. 
• Maintain their engagement when challenged by difficult 
learning activities. 
• Contribute to the learning of others. 
• Perform to standards set by the faculty. 
[STUDENT EDUCATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY] 
 
ASSURANCE OF LEARNING STANDARDS 
 
15: Management of Curricula: The school uses well-
documented, systematic processes to develop, monitor, 
evaluate, and revise the substance and delivery of the 
curricula of degree programs and to assess the impact of 
the curricula on learning. 
 
The standard requires use of a systematic process for 
curriculum management but does not require any specific 
courses in the curriculum. 
 
Normally, the curriculum management process will result in 
undergraduate and master’s level general management degree 
programs that will include learning experiences in such 
management-specific knowledge and skills areas as: 
 
• Ethical and legal responsibilities in organizations 
and society. 
• Financial theories, analysis, reporting, and markets. 
• Creation of value through the integrated production 
and distribution… 
• Group and individual dynamics in organizations. 
 
• Statistical data analysis and management science… 
• Information technologies as they influence the 
structure and processes of organizations and 
economies… 
• Domestic and global economic environments of 
organizations. 
• Other management-specific knowledge and abilities as 
identified by the school. 
[MANAGEMENT OF CURRICULA] 
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18: Master’s level degree in general management (e.g., MBA) 
programs: Knowledge and skills…Learning at the master’s 
level is developed in a more integrative, interdisciplinary 
fashion than undergraduate education. 
 
The capacities developed through the knowledge and skills 
of a general master’s level program are: 
 
• Capacity to lead in organizational situations. 
• Capacity to apply knowledge in new and unfamiliar 
circumstances through a conceptual understanding of 
relevant disciplines. 
• Capacity to adapt and innovate to solve problems, to 
cope with unforeseen events, and to manage in 
unpredictable environments. 
[MASTER’S LEVEL GENERAL MANAGEMENT LEARNING GOALS] 
 
20: The master’s level degree programs must provide 
sufficient time, content coverage, student effort, and 
student-faculty interaction to assure that the learning 
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